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Over the past few decades, federal discrimination law has become cap-
tive to an increasingly complex web of analytical frameworks.' The courts
have been unable to articulate a consistent causation or intent standard for
federal law or to provide a uniform account of the type of injury the plain-
tiff is required to suffer.2 Part of this failure is demonstrated in the ever-
increasing rift between how courts construct the discrimination inquiry for
federal age discrimination claims and claims based on other traits, such as
sex and race.'
Unfortunately, the courts are unnecessarily taking state employment
discrimination claims into this federal morass. When considering state
claims, courts often construe state statutes to adhere to federal standards
without any principled basis for doing so.
This Article makes three central contributions. First, it describes how
complex frameworks mold the federal discrimination inquiry. Second, it
provides a historical narrative regarding the development of state employ-
ment discrimination law. This narrative demonstrates that much of the
* Associate Professor, University of Cincinnati College of Law. The author would like to thank
Alex Long for comments on an earlier draft. John McGovern, Lauren Moser, Manishi Rodrigo, Matt
Deschler, and Jess Bossifusco provided invaluable research assistance.
1 See, e.g., William R. Corbett, Fixing Employment Discrimination Law, 62 SMU L. REV. 81, 82-
83 (2009); Martin J. Katz, Gross Disunity, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 857, 858-59 (2010); Deborah C. Mal-
amud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment after Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2229, 2229 (1995); Natasha
T. Martin, Pretext in Peril, 75 MO. L. REV. 313, 314 (2010); Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact:
Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 911, 912 (2005); Michael J. Zimmer,
The New Discrimination Law: Price Waterhouse Is Dead, Whither McDonnell Douglas?, 53 EMORY
L.J. 1887, 1891 (2004).
2 See, e.g., Cooper v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 368 F. App'x. 469, 473-74 (5th Cir. 2010) (per
curiam) (indicating that a plaintiff must establish an adverse employment action to prevail); Lee v. Dep't
of Veterans Affairs, 247 F. App'x 472, 477 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (indicating that plaintiff must
be subjected to an ultimate employment action to proceed on discrimination claim); Zimmer, supra note
1, at 1890-91, 1893 (discussing whether single-motive and mixed-motive claims require separate analy-
sis). At times, the courts have narrowly construed the federal statutes, only to have Congress respond by
amending key statutory language. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 93-95 (2003) (discussing
history ofjudicial and congressional development of mixed motive).
3 See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176-77 (2009) (holding that ADEA requires
plaintiff to establish but-for causation and noting that Title VII does not); Smith v. City of Jackson, 544
U.S. 228, 240 (2005) (discussing how ADEA disparate impact claims differ from Title VII claims).
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precedent used to justify importing federal standards to state claims should
not apply to many of the cases in which it is used. It also shows that there
are fundamental differences between state and federal statutes that militate
in favor of interpreting them differently. Finally, the Article demonstrates
how state law could become a model for further reform of federal antidis-
crimination statutes.
Interpreting state statutes in tandem with federal law creates state re-
gimes that are unmoored from their statutory language and ignores key dif-
ferences between federal and state protections. More importantly, the ongo-
ing dialogue regarding causation and harm is largely driven by underlying
assumptions about whether discrimination is still happening, about how it
manifests itself, and about how and whether society should address such
concerns.4 The proof structures the courts have designed to think about
these issues in the federal context frame the discrimination inquiry narrowly
and are procedurally confusing. Ignoring that states may have different
preferences raises serious concerns about the proper role of federalism in
employment discrimination law.
Importantly, if courts would look at the way state statutes are con-
structed, they could discover a more elegant, unified way of considering
discrimination claims, a way not marred by the recent disarray of federal
law. Many states chose to prohibit discrimination along a myriad of pro-
tected traits within one statutory regime. Further, many state employment
discrimination statutes address not only employment, but also other areas
such as fair housing.5
The Article is organized in the following manner. Part I discusses the
increasingly fractured nature of federal employment discrimination law.
Part II provides an overview of the structure and text of state employment
discrimination regimes, highlighting prominent differences between state
and federal law. Part III describes how state law has been drawn into the
federal frameworks. Part IV discusses ways to avoid this problematic inter-
pretation, while Part V describes how state law could create an alternative
to the federal structure, one that may convince courts that the federal
frameworks are unnecessary.
I. THE FRACTURED DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW
Federal employment discrimination law is centered on three statutes:
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act ("Title VII"), the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act ("ADEA"), and the Americans with Disabilities Act
4 See generally Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (expressing belief that in twenty-
five years, racial preferences will not be necessary).
5 See infra note 115.
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("ADA").6 Over time, numerous fractures have developed within federal
employment discrimination law.7 Two of these fractures are relevant to this
discussion. First, over the past forty years, the courts have struggled with
developing a consistent framework for analyzing claims.' Second, the
courts have inconsistently defined the level of harm needed to bring a fed-
eral claim.9 This Part first addresses the development of Title VII, the
ADEA, and the ADA, then continues by discussing the central fractures in
federal employment discrimination law.
A. Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA
In 1964, Congress enacted Title VII, which prohibits discrimination on
the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, and sex.' ° During the de-
bate regarding Title VII, Congress considered adding age as one of the pro-
tected classes." Rather than add age to Title VII, Congress instead directed
Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz to report back to Congress on the causes
and effects of age discrimination in the workplace and to propose remedial
legislation. 2
Wirtz's report to Congress recognized that age discrimination existed
and proposed that Congress prohibit it.'3 However, the Wirtz Report also
made two observations about age discrimination that are important. First,
Wirtz concluded that unlike discrimination based on race or other protected
traits, age discrimination was typically not a result of animus or intoler-
ance. 4 Rather, the most problematic type of discrimination facing older
workers was unsupported assumptions about the effect of age on ability."'
Second, Wirtz also noted that many legitimate factors used to make em-
ployment decisions correlate with age. 6 These factors include declining
health among older workers; lack of skills or educational credentials re-
6 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006) (Title Vl's primary operative provisions); 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)
(2006) (same for ADEA); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)-(b) (same for ADA). Race discrimination claims can
also be pursued under 42 U.S.C. § 1981; however, this statute is not a major driver of the federal
frameworks and will not be discussed further.
7 See Smith, 544 U.S. at 240; see also infra Part I.B.
8 See infra Part I.B.
9 See infra text accompanying note 216.
10 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 241, 253-57 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 to -17).
11 See Smith v. City of Jackson, 351 F.3d 183, 203 n.8 (5th Cir. 2003) (Stewart, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (explaining history of ADEA), aft'd, 544 U.S. 228 (2005).
12 See Smith, 544 U.S. at 232.
13 See Smith, 351 F.3d at 194.
14 See id. at193.
15 id.
16 Smith, 544 U.S. at 259 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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quired for jobs; and an outdated skill set caused by rapid technological ad-
vances.'
7
When Congress enacted the ADEA, it used primary operative provi-
sions that were similar to those in Title VII. " While the main provisions of
Title VII and theADEA are similar, two distinctions warrant mention. First,
the ADEA contains the so-called "RFOA provision," which specifically
allows employers to take actions as long as the actions are based on a "rea-
sonable factor other than age."' 9 Second, the remedies provisions of the
ADEA are drawn from the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), making the
ADEA an interesting hybrid of Title VII and the FLSA. 0
In 1990, Congress enacted the ADA.2' The ADA prohibits "discrimi-
nat[ion] against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to
job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of em-
ployees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions,
and privileges of employment." 2 It then further defines discrimination in a
separate subsection, containing seven separate definitional sections.2 3
B. Fractures Develop in Key Areas of Federal Law
In 1971, the Supreme Court interpreted Title VII to allow plaintiffs to
assert discrimination based on disparate impact,24 reasoning that Title VII
prohibited not only intentional conduct, but policies and practices that cre-
ated "built-in headwinds" to the hiring of black employees.25 The Court, in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,26 recognized disparate impact discrimination
and developed a rudimentary framework for analyzing those claims.27
Over the next two decades, the courts struggled with the appropriate
framework for analyzing disparate impact cases, largely focusing on how
the plaintiff would be allowed to establish a causal link between a facially
17 See id.
18 The ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age" or "to limit, segregate, or
classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employ-
ment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's
age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2006); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006) (Title VIl's primary operative
provisions).
19 See Smith, 544 U.S. at 239 (plurality opinion) (discussing the RFOA provision).
20 See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 578 (1978).
21 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
22 Id.
23 Id. § 12112(b).
24 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-32 (1971).
25 Id. at 432 (internal quotation marks omitted).
26 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
27 Id. at 431.
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neutral policy and a protected trait and how a defendant would be able to
defend against such claims. 8 In the late 1980s, the Court modified the test
to be applied to disparate impact claims in two cases, Watson v. Fort Worth
Bank & Trust29 and Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.3" In Watson, the
Court (in a portion of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's opinion joined by a
plurality)3 indicated that to prove a disparate impact "[t]he plaintiff must
... identify[] the specific employment practice that is challenged" and must
establish statistical evidence of a kind and degree sufficient to show that the
protected class caused the disparity.32 The burden of production then shifts
to the defendant to show "that its employment practices are based on legit-
imate business reasons."33 Once the defendant meets this burden, the plain-
tiff can prevail by showing that other tests could have been used that would
not create the same disparity.34 A year later, in Wards Cove, a five-Justice
majority largely reaffirmed the Watson plurality's interpretation of the re-
quirements for proving disparate impact.3"
Unhappy with the court-created structure, Congress amended Title VII
in 1991 36 The 1991 amendment allows a plaintiff to prevail on a disparate
impact claim if the plaintiff establishes that a specific practice causes a dis-
parate impact based on a trait protected by Title VlI.37 The employer has an
affirmative defense to liability, if it can establish that a "practice is job re-
lated for the position in question and consistent with business necessity- 3
However, even if the defendant establishes this affirmative defense, the
plaintiff may prevail by proving that the employer could have adopted al-
ternate practices that would not result in a disparate impact.39
When Congress amended Title VII, it did not make similar changes in
the ADEA or the ADA." In 2005, the Supreme Court held that disparate
impact claims were cognizable under the ADEA.4 However, it chose to
create a different analytical structure for these cases. The Court's fracturing
28 See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); see also Watson v. Fort Worth
Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994-95 (1988) (plurality opinion).
29 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
30 490 U.S. 642 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, §
105, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074.
31 Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote the majority opinion and was joined by Chief Justice
William Rehnquist, Justice Byron White, and Justice Antonin Scalia regarding the portion being dis-
cussed. Watson, 487 U.S. at 982.
32 Id. at 994 (plurality opinion).
" Jd. at 998.
34 id.
35 Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 656-57.
36 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2006).
37 See id. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(B).
38 See id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
39 See id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii).
40 Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005).
41 id.
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of Title VII and the ADEA centered on three rationales. First, the Court
indicated that Congress had not amended the ADEA to include the Title VII
disparate impact structure, second, that the RFOA provision in the ADEA
required a different analysis, and third, that the Wirtz Report demonstrated
that ADEA claims should not work in the same way Title VII claims did.42
In the post-Smith ADEA disparate impact analysis, the first step is the
same as the analysis for Title VII claims prior to the 1991 amendments;
however, in the second step an employer must establish that the challenged
practice was based on a reasonable factor other than age.43 The employee
may not prevail on an ADEA disparate impact claim by establishing the
existence of alternative practices." The Court has not determined how dis-
parate impact claims would proceed under the ADA.45
The courts developed a separate way of thinking about disparate
treatment claims. The early Title VII cases involving disparate treatment
were often based on employer decisions that were explicitly race- or gen-
der-based. 6 These claims of facially discriminatory policies later became
grouped into a type of individual disparate treatment case referred to as a
direct evidence case.47 The courts tended to use simple formulations in
42 Id. at 240-41.
43 See id. at 242; see also Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 554 U.S. 84, 100-02 (2008)
(clarifying that employer's burden at second step is one of both production and persuasion).
44 Smith, 544 U.S. at 243.
45 Sandra F. Sperino, Rethinking Discrimination Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 69,75 (2011).
46 See, e.g., Vogler v. McCarty, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 368, 374-75 (E.D. La. 1968) (alleging that
employer engaged in discrimination by only hiring union members when the union itself engaged in
discriminatory membership practices), affd sub nom. Int'l Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators v. Vogler,
407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969); Weeks v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 277 F. Supp. 117, 117 (S.D. Ga. 1967)
(alleging that an employer had a policy of making gender a qualification for a switchman position), affd
in part, revd in part, 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969); Cooper v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 781,
781 (E.D. La. 1967) (alleging discrimination based on company policy that required women to resign
upon marriage).
47 See, e.g., Stone v. Autoliv ASP, Inc., 210 F.3d 1132, 1137 (10th Cir. 2000) (indicating that a
company policy of discrimination constitutes direct evidence). Outside of the context of facially dis-
criminatory policies, courts have had a difficult time defining direct evidence, and definitions regarding
what constitutes direct evidence vary. While the definitions of these terms appears to vary slightly by
circuit, direct evidence of discrimination can be described as 'evidence, that, if believed, proves the
existence of a fact in issue without inference or presumption . . . [and] is composed of only the most
blatant remarks, whose intent could be nothing other than to discriminate on the basis of some imper-
missible factor."' Rojas v. Florida, 285 F.3d 1339, 1342 n.2 (1 th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (quoting
Schoenfeld v. Babbitt, 168 F.3d 1257, 1266 (11 th Cir. 1999)). One court has described direct evidence
as that which "'essentially requires an admission by the employer,"' and explained that "such evidence
'is rare."' Argyropoulos v. City of Alton, 539 F.3d 724, 733 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Benders v. Bel-
lows & Bellows, 515 F.3d 757, 764 (7th Cir. 2008)). "'A statement that can plausibly be interpreted two
different ways-one discriminatory and the other benign--toes not directly reflect illegal animus, and,
thus, does not constitute direct evidence."' Vaughn v. Epworth Villa, 537 F.3d 1147, 1154-55 (10th Cir.
2008) (quoting Hall v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 476 F.3d 847, 855 (10th Cir. 2007)).
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evaluating direct evidence cases, essentially requiring a plaintiff to establish
that a decision was taken because of a protected trait.4"
However, as these explicit policies and decisions became less com-
mon, the courts began to develop an alternate analytical structure for ana-
lyzing claims. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,4 9 the Supreme Court
created a three-part, burden-shifting test for analyzing individual disparate
treatment claims."0 Under McDonnell Douglas, a court first evaluates the
prima facie case, which requires proof that
(i) [the plaintiff] belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job
for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was
rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer con-
tinued to seek applicants from persons of [plaintiffs] qualifications. 5
The burden then "shift[s] to the employer to articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." 2 If the defendant
meets this requirement, the plaintiff can still prevail by demonstrating that
the defendant's reason for the rejection was a pretext for discrimination.53
The underlying concern in the McDonnell Douglas line of cases is
whether the plaintiff has enough evidence to establish that an employer
made a decision based on a protected trait.54 McDonnell Douglas did not
frame this causal question as one in which both legitimate and discriminato-
ry factors might be at work.5 In the 1989 case of Price Waterhouse v. Hop-
kins,56 the Supreme Court interpreted Title VII as allowing so called
48 See. e.g., Mach v. Will Cnty. Sheriff, 580 F.3d 495, 499 (7th Cir. 2009); Paz v. Wauconda
Healthcare & Rehab. Ctr., LLC, 464 F.3d 659, 666 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting that under the direct method
of proving discrimination, the court should not use a burden-shifting framework).
49 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
50 Id. at 802-03. Some circuits will allow a plaintiff to make a case of discrimination without
resorting to McDonnell Douglas, if the plaintiff has "either direct or circumstantial evidence that sup-
ports an inference of intentional discrimination." Coffman v. Indianapolis Fire Dep't, 578 F.3d 559,
563 (7th Cir. 2009).
51 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 804. In McDonnell Douglas itself, the Court noted that the facts required to establish a
prima facie case will necessarily vary, depending on the case. Id. at 802 n.13. In subsequent cases, the
Court further considered how the McDonnell Douglas test would operate. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v.
Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507 (1993); Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
54 See Tristin K. Green, Making Sense of the McDonnell Douglas Framework: Circumstantial
Evidence and Proof of Disparate Treatment Under Title VII, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 983, 1006-007 (1999).
55 By using the term causation, this Author does not mean to imply causation as that term is often
understood in the common law tort context. Rather, its use means that there is some link between the
adverse action and a protected trait. As discussed in other work, it is difficult to force discrimination
claims into a traditional tort model. See Sandra F. Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, the Common Law,
and Proximate Cause, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 2, 15-16), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=2013453 (last revised Sept. 17, 2012).
56 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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"mixed-motive" claims.57 The Court held that a plaintiff must establish that
a protected trait played a motivating part in the employment decision. 8 The
employer has the ability to avoid liability by proving an affirmative de-
fense-that it would have made the same decision, even if it had not al-
lowed the protected trait to play a role. 9
In 1991, Congress also amended Title VII to change the structure
enunciated in Price Waterhouse.6 ° Congress indicated that a plaintiff could
prevail on a discrimination claim under Title VII by establishing that a pro-
tected trait played a motivating factor in an employment decision." Con-
gress also created an affirmative defense, which, if proven, would be a par-
tial defense to damages. 2 However, the statutory language did not explain
how this new "motivating factor" language fit with the existing fiameworks
for evaluating discrimination cases.
Over the next two decades, the Supreme Court decided two more cases
that further fractured analysis in mixed-motive cases. While the Justices in
Price Waterhouse agreed on many of the central contours of mixed-motive
claims, they disagreed about whether the plaintiff would need to have direct
evidence to proceed on a mixed-motive case.63 After McDonnell Douglas,
courts had started to develop a dichotomy between the analytical structures
used for direct evidence cases and those used for cases with what the courts
termed circumstantial evidence.' In Desert Palace v. Costa,65 the Court
held that the direct/circumstantial dichotomy would not be imported into
the mixed-motive context under Title VI. 66 While the direct/circumstantial
evidence dichotomy no longer exists for mixed-motive cases, some circuits
have continued to use the dichotomy in single-motive cases.67
The second case the Supreme Court resolved in the mixed-motive con-
text involved the ADEA. When Congress added the "motivating factor"
language to Title VII, it did not make similar changes to the ADEA or
ADA.68 The question arose whether mixed-motive claims were actionable
57 Id. at 241-43 (plurality opinion).
58 Id. at 244-45. For a description of how the same decision language was imported from constitu-
tional claims, see Catherine T. Struve, Shifting Burdens: Discrimination Law Through the Lens of Jury
Instructions, 51 B.C. L. REV. 279, 298-299 (2010).
59 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244-45 (plurality opinion).
60 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006).
61 id.
62 Id. As with the disparate impact framework, when Congress added the "motivating factor"
language to Title VII, it did not make similar changes to the ADEA. Struve, supra note 58, at 288-90.
63 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 271 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that to get benefit of
mixed-motive framework, plaintiff would be required to present direct evidence of discrimination).
64 Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 584 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Desert Palace,
Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 95 (2003).
65 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
66 Id.at10l-02.
67 Wright v. Murray Guard, Inc., 455 F.3d 702, 717-18 (6th Cir. 2006) (discussing confusion).
68 Struve, supra note 58, at 290.
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under the ADEA. In Gross v. FBL Financial Services,69 the Supreme Court
held that plaintiffs proceeding under the ADEA must prove that age was the
"but for" cause of the alleged employment action.7" The Gross decision
fractured the discrimination inquiry even more, requiring the plaintiff to
prove a stronger causal link in age cases than in cases under Title VII.
During this same time period, the courts were developing a fractured
line of cases regarding the amount of harm a plaintiff would need to allege
to state a cognizable claim. Through the development of McDonnell Doug-
las, the courts had inserted the words "adverse employment action" into the
third prong of the prima facie case.7 While this wording was originally a
substitute for specific enunciation of the kind of decision (e.g., termination
or failure to promote), courts began to interpret the term "adverse employ-
ment action" as having greater significance.72 Some courts now hold that in
order to make a viable claim under the employment discrimination statutes,
a plaintiff must be able to establish that an action meets a certain threshold
level of seriousness.73 For example, in some circuits a discriminatory evalu-
ation or lateral transfer will not be deemed serious enough to warrant feder-
al protection.74 There is currently a circuit split regarding what the threshold
should be.75
This threshold of harm disagreement is further exacerbated by the fact
that the courts developed a separate language for talking about harm in the
harassment context. In determining when harassment is sufficient to state a
claim, the Supreme Court has held that "it must be sufficiently severe or
pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment."' 76 Both the
harassment and the disparate treatment standards are at odds with the stand-
ard the Supreme Court has enunciated in the Title VII retaliation context-
that the challenged conduct is such that a reasonable person would be dis-
suaded from making a complaint.77
69 557 U.S. 167 (2009).
70 Id. at 176.
71 See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002).
72 See, e.g., Watson v. Magee Women's Hosp., 472 F. Supp. 325, 329-30 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (trans-
lating McDonnell Douglas test from failure to hire context by using concept of adverse employment
action).
73 See, e.g., Cooper v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 368 F. App'x 469, 474 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curi-
am).
74 See id. at 474.
75 See, e.g., Lee v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 247 F. App'x 472, 477 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam)
(holding that plaintiff must establish an ultimate employment action).
76 Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (alteration in original) (quoting
Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11 th Cir. 1982)); see also Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc.,
510 U.S. 17, 21-23 (1993).
77 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006).
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C. Causation, Harm, and Frameworks
The vast array of frameworks that the courts use to define how plain-
tiffs must establish claims have complicated federal law. While many of
these frameworks grow out of the statutory language of the federal statutes,
they also derive from those statutes' unique histories, as well as the choices
the Supreme Court has made regarding how to piece together the purpose of
the statutes and their legislative and textual history." Underlying these
frameworks are certain assumptions about discrimination itself. This Part
explores the idea that the frameworks represent a set of choices about how
to view discrimination and highlights the problems caused by their com-
plexity.
As described in the prior Parts, the courts and Congress have devel-
oped one framework for dealing with disparate impact claims under Title
VII and another for ADEA claims.79 They have separated disparate impact
claims and disparate treatment, and have also given disparate treatment
claims a complex architecture.'0 In many circuits, this structure first re-
quires courts to determine whether a discrimination claim is based on a
single motive or mixed motives.8' If there is a single-motive case, the court
must then determine whether the direct evidence framework is required or
whether to use the McDonnell Douglas test.82 If the case is a mixed-motive
one, the court can use the motivating factor structure for Title VII cases, but
not for ADEA cases.83
This complex architecture represents a narrow way of viewing dis-
crimination claims that is, in many ways, largely unconnected to the chang-
ing face of discrimination. By dividing discrimination claims into disparate
treatment claims and disparate impact claims, the courts have ignored that
discrimination may result from a combination of unconscious bias and tra-
ditionally conceived intentional bias,' or perhaps through unconscious bias
alone. 5 Neither disparate-impact nor disparate-treatment claims recognize
78 See Ann C. McGinley, .Viva la Evolucion.: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title VII, 9
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 415, 446 n.194, 479 (2000) (discussing dynamic statutory interpretation).
The author recognizes that it also is possible to read the frameworks as political choices that are framed
through the lens of statutory interpretation. id. at 446 n.194.
79 See supra Part I.B.
80 See supra notes 45-53 and accompanying text.
81 See Wright v. Murray Guard, Inc., 455 F.3d 702, 717-18 (6th Cir. 2006).
82 id.
83 Struve, supra note 58, at 290.
84 The author is not expressing any opinion on whether unconscious bias is intentional or not.
Rather, this sentence is meant to contrast unconscious discrimination with more traditional ways of
conceiving intentional discrimination as conscious.
85 See Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA. L.
REV. 741, 745 (2005); Charles R. Lawrence Ill, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322-25 (1987).
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the possibility of negligent discrimination.86 Additionally, structural dis-
crimination is not fully captured within any of the frameworks.87
Further, courts have failed to fully explore whether the substantive
equality model underlying disparate impact applies in other contexts8" or
whether the current disparate impact tests fairly capture all conduct that
might limit or tend to limit a plaintiffs opportunities.89 Plaintiffs unable to
offer proof of specific practices that create gross statistical disparities under
the disparate impact framework are largely left with models based on for-
mal equality.9" None of the proof structures appropriately capture intersec-
tional discrimination.9'
In the individual disparate treatment context, the courts largely seem to
assume discrimination as a fairly constant bad motive that resides in an
individual.92 The proof structures appear tied to a concept of discrimination
that seeks to ferret out a single decision maker (or small group of decision
makers) who acted with a certain kind of animus toward an individual
plaintiff.93 This narrow concept of intent ignores the possibility of disparate
influences and structural discrimination.
It also creates causal requirements between a protected trait and an
employment decision that may be impossible to prove in many real-world
scenarios. Take for example the McDonnell Douglas test. The question in
the McDonnell Douglas case itself was framed as whether the company was
discriminating against the plaintiff because of his illegal protest activities or
whether the company was using these activities as an excuse to cover up its
racially motivated decision not to re-hire him.94 The McDonnell Douglas
test, therefore, focuses on a single decision made at a particular point of
time. It tries to link the specific decision to the protected trait to establish a
causal narrative. In other situations with multiple players and multiple deci-
86 See generally David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899
(1993) (discussing negligent discrimination).
87 See Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of
Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 138 (2003).
88 See, e.g., Spivey v. Beverly Enters., Inc., 196 F.3d 1309, 1314 (11 th Cir. 1999) (rejecting claim
that employer's refusal to grant modified work to pregnant women created a disparate impact because
plaintiff failed to present evidence of gross statistical disparity).
89 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006), with id. § 2000e-2(k) (showing how the current dis-
parate impact tests help define Title VII's primary operative provision).
90 Spivey, 196 F.3dat 1314.
91 See Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist
Critique ofAntidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory andAntiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
139, 140, 152 (arguing that discrimination theory does not fully address discrimination that happens
against black women).
92 See Martin, supra note 1, at 374.
93 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
94 Id. at 80 1.
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sions or actions being taken over time, McDonnell Douglas has proven
problematic.95
Likewise, federal statutes are interpreted as enshrining certain assump-
tions about harm. The harassment inquiry contains the idea that harassment
does not affect the terms or conditions of an employee's work environment
unless it is fairly severe or pervasive.96 However, that is a factual assump-
tion made by judges that does not reflect the actual statutory language of
the federal statutes, which only require that the terms or conditions of the
plaintiff's employment were affected or that the conduct did or tended to
deprive the plaintiff of employment opportunities.97 Many circuits have
modified McDonnell Douglas to only provide relief to plaintiffs who can
prove they suffered an adverse employment action.98
Notice that underlying these federal constructs are choices about how
discrimination operates. The structures developed in the 1970s were
grounded in the idea that discrimination against people within certain pro-
tected classes regularly occurred.9 9 However, the standards developed in
these cases were inexact and were tied to the particular cases before the
Court."°° Beginning in the 1980s, the courts began to impose tighter causal
standards for disparate impact claims, indicating these tighter standards
were necessary to prevent employers from being held liable for numerical
anomalies in workforce statistics.' 1° In the 2000s, the Supreme Court inter-
preted the ADEA to have a different causal standard than Title VII, reason-
ing that age discrimination and discrimination prohibited under Title VII
were different in important ways."2
Not only do the federal frameworks provide a narrow frame through
which to view the discrimination inquiry, they are also procedurally confus-
ing. "It remains unclear whether the types of discrimination are separate
'claims' under the statutes or whether they are simply ways of clarifying the
statutes' primary operative language."'' 3 For example, "it is not completely
clear whether the term 'mixed motive' describes a type of discrimination, a
95 See, e.g., Michael J. Zimmer, A Chain of Inferences Proving Discrimination, 79 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1243, 1285-86 (2008) (discussing problems with using McDonnell Douglas in mixed-motive
situations).
96 See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
97 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006) (Title Vii's operative provisions).
98 See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002).
99 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 800; Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,427-28 (1971).
100 See, e.g., Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430,434 n.10.
101 Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656-57 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074.
102 Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 174-75 (2009).
103 Sperino, supra note 45, at 112; see also Kaitlin Picco, Comment, The Mixed-Motive Mess:
Defining and Applying a Mixed-Motive Framework, 26 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 461, 475 (2011)
(discussing confusion among courts).
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rubric for evaluating a discrimination claim, or perhaps both.""'° The an-
swer to whether mixed motive is a claim or a way of analyzing a claim is
important because it determines whether plaintiffs proceeding under single-
motive cases can use the broader "motivating factor" language provided in
the 1991 amendments at both the summary judgment stage and in jury in-
structions."°5 This question also raises profound issues regarding whether
McDonnell Douglas survives as a stand-alone analytical structure and
whether the direct/circumstantial evidence dichotomy is still appropriate in
single-motive cases. Questions about what the frameworks are procedural-
ly, will become more important as courts strengthen the pleading require-
ments in federal court.
As this Part demonstrates, federal employment discrimination is in-
creasingly complex. These complexities have practical effects on litigants.
The frameworks "create[] an uncertainty that makes it difficult for parties to
determine potential liability both ex post and ex ante."'0 6 The parties are
forced to prove their cases through technical frameworks that, in some cas-
es, do not provide a complete framework for evaluating discrimination
claims.0 7 And, as Professor Martin Katz noted: "[S]uch a state of affairs
breeds cynicism about the law in this area, as it suggests that outcomes de-
pend more on technicalities than on the merits of a particular case."'08 This
is the muddled landscape into which state discrimination law is being
drawn.
II. THE STATE LAW LANDSCAPE
All fifty states also have enacted statutes that prohibit discrimination
in the workplace.0 9 However, none of the state statutes mimics the federal
104 Sperino, supra note 45, at 113; see also Picco, supra note 103, at 475.
105 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1994).
106 Sperino, supra note 45, at 114.
107 Martin J. Katz, Unifying Disparate Treatment (Really), 59 HASTINGS L.J. 643, 644 (2008).
108 Id.
109 See ALA. CODE §§ 25-1-21 to -28 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2012 Sess.); ALASKA STAT. §
18.80.220 (LEXIS through 2011 Sess.); ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 41-1463 to -1465 (LexisNexis, LEXIS
through 2012 legislation); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-107(a)(1) (LEXIS through 2012 Fiscal Sess. &
updates); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12920-12926 (Deering, LEXIS through 2012 Sess. Ch. 288); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 24-34-402 (LEXIS through 2012 Sess.); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-60 (LEXIS through
2011 legislation); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 711 (LEXIS through 2012 Ch. 404); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 760.10 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2012 Sess.); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 45-19-29 to -35 (LEXIS through
2012 Sess.); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 378-2 to -3 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2012 Sess., Acts 1-
200); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 67-5909 to -5910 (LEXIS through 2012 Sess.); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/2-102 to -105 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2012 Legis. Sess., Pub. Acts. 97-848); IND. CODE ANN. §§
22-9-1-3, 22-9-2-2, 22-9-5-19 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2012 Sess., P.L. 161); IOWA CODE § 216.6
(LEXIS through 2011 legislation); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1009 (LEXIS through 2011 Supp.); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 344.040-.050 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2012 Sess.); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23:312,
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statutes in all important respects. These differences suggest courts should
be more cautious in deciding whether state laws should adopt the frame-
works applied in federal discrimination claims.
First, a small, yet significant, number of states adopted discrimination
protections prior to their federal enactment. For example, Pennsylvania,
Massachusetts, and New York had employment statutes governing race,
and age before their federal counterparts."° Other states adopted at least one
protection prior to federal action."' More than half of the states prohibited
:323, :332, :342, :352, :368 (LEXIS through 2012 Sess.); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 4572-4573
(LEXIS through 2011 Sess. Ch. 702); MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T §§ 20-602 to -607 (LexisNexis,
LEXIS through 2012 Gen. Assemb.); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through
2012 Legis. Sess. Act 239); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. §§ 37.2102, .2202-.2206 (LexisNexis, LEXIS
through 2012 P.A. 86, 88-177, 179-200, 202-236, 240, 249); MINN. STAT. § 363A.08 (LEXIS through
2012 Sess. Ch. 299); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 25-9-103, 25-9-149 (LEXIS through 2012 Sess.); MO. REV.
STAT. §§ 213.010, .055 (LEXIS through 2012 Sess.); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 49-2-101, 49-2-303
(LEXIS through 2011 Sess.); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 48-1101 to -1115 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through
2012 Sess.); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 613.330-390 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2011 Sess.); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 354-A:1 to :7 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2012 Sess. Ch. 290); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 10:5-4, -12 (LEXIS through 2012 Ch. 44); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-1-7, 28-1-9 (LexisNexis, LEXIS
through 2012 Sess.); N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 291, 296 (Consol., LEXIS through 2012 Ch. 1-447); N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 143422.1 to .3 (LEXIS through 2011 Sess.); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-02.4-03 to 14-
02.4-09 (LEXIS through 2011 Legis. Sess.); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02 (LexisNexis, LEXIS
through 2012 legislation); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, §§ 1302-1308 (LEXIS through 2012 Sess.); OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 659A.006, .009, .030 (LEXIS through 2011 Legis. Sess.); 43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 955
(LEXIS through 2012 Sess., Act 143); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 28-5-1 to -7 (LEXIS through 2011 Sess.);
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-13-10 to -80 (LEXIS through 2011 Sess.); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-13-10
(LEXIS through 2012 Sess.); TENN. CODE. ANN. §§ 4-21-401 to 408 (LEXIS through 2011 Sess.);
TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 21.051-.055 (LEXIS through 2011 1st Called Sess.); UTAH CODE ANN. §§
34A-5-101 to -106 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2012 4th Spec. Sess.); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495
(LEXIS through 2011 Sess.); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3903 (LEXIS through 2012 Sess.); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 49.60.040, 49.60.180 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2012 Sess.); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§
5-11-3, -9 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2012 Sess.); WIS. STAT. §§ 111.321-322 (LEXIS through 2011
Act 113); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-9-101 to -105 (LEXIS through 2012 Budget Sess.).
110 See Act of May 23, 1946, ch. 368, 1946 Mass. Acts 372 (codified at MASS. ANN. LAWS Ch.
151B, § 4 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2012 Legis. Sess. Act 239)); Act of Aug. 1, 1950, ch. 697, 1950
Mass. Acts 590 (codified at MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 151 B, § 4); Law Against Discrimination, ch. 414,
1961 N.Y. Laws 1447 (codified at N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 290-291 (Consol. LEXIS through 2012 Ch. 1-
447)); Act of Apr. 14, 1958, ch. 738, 1958 N.Y. Laws 1591 (codified at N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296); Penn-
sylvania Fair Employment Practice Act, No. 222, 1955 Pa. Laws 744 (codified at 43 PA. CONS. STAT. §
955 (LEXIS through 2012 Sess., Act 143)). This Article does not discuss preemption because the federal
discrimination statutes often do not preempt state legislation. For a discussion of preemption and work-
place law, see generally Henry H. Drummonds, The Sister Sovereign States: Preemption and the Second
Twentieth Century Revolution in the Law of the American Workplace, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 469 (1993).
111 See, e.g., Act of March 9, 1953, ch. 18, 1953 Alaska Sess. Laws 64 (codified at ALASKA STAT.
§ 18.80.220 (LEXIS through 2011 Sess.)); Act of July 9, 1960, ch. 337, 52 Del. Laws 795 (1959) (codi-
fied at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 711 (LEXIS through 2012 Ch. 404)); Act of Apr. 13, 1961, ch. 248,
1961 Kan. Sess. Laws 542 (codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1009 (LEXIS through 2011 Supp.)); Act
of June 8, 1959, no. 123, 1959 Mo. Laws i (codified at MO. REV. STAT. § 213.055 (LEXIS through 2012
Sess.)); Law Against Discrimination, ch. 169, 1945 N.J. Laws 589, 594-95 (codified at N.J. STAT ANN.
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disability discrimination in private employment prior to the ADA's enact-
ment in 1990.112 There are several states that adopted age discrimination
§ 10:5-12 (LEXIS through 2012 Ch. 44)); Act of Apr. 1, 1949, ch. 2181, 1949 R.I. Acts & Resolves 157
(codified at R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 28-5-2 to -7 (LEXIS through 2011 Sess.)); Act of June 29, 1963, no.
196, 1963 Vt. Acts & Resolves 209 (codified at VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495 (LEXIS through 2011
Sess.)); Law Against Discrimination in Employment, ch. 183, 1949 Wash. Sess. Laws 506 (codified at
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 49.60.040 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2012 Sess.)).
112 See Act of Apr. 18, 1985, ch. 167, § 3, 1985 Ariz. Sess. Laws 405, 407 (codified at AR[Z. REV.
STAT. § 41-1463 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2012 legislation)) (adopting disability protections in
1985); Act of Sept. 19, 1980, ch. 992, § 12920, 1980 Cal. Stat. 3142 (codified at CAL. GOV'T CODE §
12920 (Deering, LEXIS through 2012 Sess. Ch. 288)) (in 1980); Act of June 22, 1979, ch. 239, § 24-34-
402, 1979 Colo. Sess. Laws 922, 929-30 (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402 (LEXIS through
2012 Sess.)) (in 1979); Act effective July 1, 1977, ch. 77-341, § 13.261, 1977 Fla. Laws 1461, 1465
(codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.10 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2012 Sess.)) (in 1977); Fair Em-
ployment Practices Act of 1978, no. 807, 1978 Ga. Laws 859 (codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 45-19-29
(LEXIS through 2012 Sess.)) (in 1978); Act of June 2, 1981, Act 94, § 378-2, 1981 Haw. Sess. Laws
184, 185 (codified at HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378-2 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2012 Sess., Acts I-
200)) (in 1981); Act of Mar. 29, 1988, ch. 225, 1988 Idaho Sess. Laws 433 (codified at IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 67-5909 (LEXIS through 2012 Sess.)) (in 1988); Act of Dec. 6, 1979, Pub. Act 81-1267, § I-
102, 1980 111. Laws 247 (codified at 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-102 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through
2012 Legis. Sess., Pub. Acts 97-848)) (in 1980); Act of Feb. 22, 1974, ch. 209, 1974 Kan. Sess. Laws
759 (codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1009 (LEXIS through 2011 Supp.)) (in 1974); Act effective Oct.
1, 1975, ch. 358, 1975 Me. Laws 986 (codified at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4572 (LEXIS through
2011 Sess. Ch. 702)) (in 1975); Act of May 31, 1974, ch. 601, 1974 Md. Laws 2029 (codified at MD.
CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 20-606 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2012 Gen. Assemb.)) (in 1974); Act
of May 24, 1973, ch. 729, § 3, 1973 Minn. Laws 2161 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 363A.08 (LEXIS
through 2012 Sess. Ch. 299)) (in 1973); Act of May 15, 1984, ch. 488, § 333, 1984 Miss. Laws 628
(codified at Miss. CODE ANN. § 25-9-149 (LEXIS through 2012 Sess.)) (in 1984); Act of June 13, 1978,
§ 296.020, 1978 Mo. Laws 560 (codified at Mo. REV. STAT. § 213.055 (LEXIS through 2012 Sess.)) (in
1978); Act of Mar. 25, 1974, ch. 283, § 2, 1974 Mont. Laws 696, 698 (codified at MONT. CODE ANN. §
49-2-303 (LEXIS through 2011 Sess.)) (in 1974); Act of May 10, 1973, LB 266, § 1, 1973 Neb. Laws
752 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-1101 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2012 Sess.)) (in 1973);
Act of Apr. 24, 1971, ch. 508, § 1, 1971 Nev. Stat. 1056 (codified at NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 613.330
(LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2011 Sess.)) (in 1971); Act of Mar. 26, 1973, ch. 155, § 2, 1973 N.M.
Laws 533, 534-35 (codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-7 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2012 Sess.)) (in
1973); Equal Employment Practices Act, ch. 726 § 1, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 933 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 143-422.2 (LEXIS through 2011 Sess.)) (in 1977); Human Rights Act, ch. 173, 1983 N.D. Laws
466 (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-03 (LEXIS through 2011 Legis. Sess.)) (in 1983); Act of
Apr. 23, 1976, § 4112.02, 1975-76 Ohio Laws 424, 432 (codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02
(LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2012 legislation)) (in 1976); Act of June 22, 1981, ch. 231, § 2, 1981 Okla.
Sess. Laws 551, 552 (codified at OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1302 (LEXIS through 2012 Sess.)) (in
1981); Act of June 21, 1983, ch. 225, § 2, 1983 Or. Laws 249, 250 (codified at OR. REV. STAT. §
659A.006 (LEXIS through 2011 Legis. Sess.)) (in 1983); Act of May 11, 1973, ch. 132, § 28-5-7, 1973
R.I. Pub. Laws 545, 547 (codified at R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-7 (LEXIS through 2011 Sess.)) (in 1973);
Act of Mar. 11, 1986, ch. 170, § 7, 1986 S.D. Sess. Laws 388, 389 (codified at S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §
20-13-10 (LEXIS through 2012 Sess.)) (in 1986); Act of Feb. 23, 1979, ch. 136, § 3, 1979 Utah Laws
756, 760 (codified at UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-5-106 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2012 4th Spec.
Sess.)) (in 1979); Act of May 1, 1981, no. 65, § 1, 1981 Vt. Acts & Resolves 242 (codified at VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 495 (LEXIS through 2011 Sess.)) (in 1981); Act ofMar. 21, 1985, ch. 421, § 51.01-41,
1985 Va. Acts 539, 552 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3900 (LEXIS through 2012 Sess.)) (in 1985);
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prohibitions prior to the ADEA's enactment in 1967 and even prior to the
Wirtz Report."3
Second, when the states enacted employment discrimination statutes,
almost all of them chose omnibus legislation that includes all of the protect-
ed traits under the same statutory regime." 4 What makes mass importation
Act of Mar. 8, 1979, ch. 127, § 2, 1979 Wash. Sess. Laws 481,482 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 49.60.180 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2012 Sess.)) (in 1979); Act of Apr. 7, 1981, ch. 128, § 5-11-2,
1981 W. Va. Acts 541, 542 (codified at W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5-11-9 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2012
Sess.)) (in 1981); Act of May 6, 1982, ch. 334, 1981 Wis. Sess. Laws 1378 (codified at WIS. STAT. §§
111.321 (LEXIS through 2011 Act 113)) (in 1981); Act of Feb. 8, 1985, ch. 5, § 1, 1985 Wyo. Sess.
Laws 4 (codified at WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-9-105 (LEXIS through 2012 Budget Sess.)) (in 1985); see
also Drummonds, supra note 110, at 490 n. 113 (discussing disability protections adopted by the states).
113 See Fair Employment Practices Act, Pub. Act No. 145, § 3, 1959 Conn. Pub. Acts 418, 418-19
(codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-60 (LEXIS through 2011 legislation)); Act of August 1, 1950, ch.
697, §§ 6-8, 1950 Mass. Acts 590, 591 (codified at MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4 (LexisNexis,
LEXIS through 2012 Legis. Sess. Act 239)); Act of May 7, 1962, ch. 37, §§ 2-3, 7, 1962 N.J. Laws 158,
159, 162-63 (codified N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-4, -12 (LEXIS through 2012 Ch. 44); Act of April 17,
1961, ch. 609, 1961 N.Y. Laws 1867 (codified at N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (Consol., LEXIS through 2012
Ch. 1-447)); Pennsylvania Fair Employment Practices Act, No. 222, §§ 1-5, 1955 Pa. Laws 744, 744-46
(codified at 43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 955 (LEXIS through 2012 Sess., Act 143)). Some states continue to
be the early adopters, offering protections against sexual orientation discrimination which do not yet
exist at the federal level. See Anita Bernstein, Civil Rights Violations = Broken Windows: De Minimis
Curet Lex, 62 FLA. L. REV. 895, 918 & n.135 (2010).
114 See ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220 (LEXIS through 2011 Sess.); ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 41-1463 to -
1465 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2012 legislation); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12920-12926 (Deering,
LEXIS through 2012 Sess. Ch. 288); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402 (LEXIS through 2012 Sess.);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-60 (LEXIS through 2011 legislation); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.10 (LexisNexis,
LEXIS through 2012 Sess.); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 45-19-29 to -35 (LEXIS through 2012 Sess.); HAW.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 378-2 to -3 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2012 Sess., Acts 1-200); IDAHO CODE
ANN. §§ 67-5909 to -5910 (LEXIS through 2012 Sess.); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-102 to -105
(LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2012 Legis. Sess., Pub. Acts 97-848); IOWA CODE § 216.6 (LEXIS
through 2011 legislation); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 344.040-.050 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2012
Sess.); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 4572-4573 (LEXIS through 2011 Sess. Ch. 702); MD. CODE
ANN., STATE GOV'T §§ 20-601 to -609 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2012 Gen. Assemb.); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 151B, § 4 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2012 Legis. Sess. Act 239); MINN. STAT. § 363A.08
(LEXIS through 2012 Sess. Ch. 299); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 25-9-103, 25-9-149 (LEXIS through 2012
Sess.) (prohibiting discrimination for state service jobs); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 213.010, .055 (LEXIS
through 2012 Sess.); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 49-2-101, 49-2-303 (LEXIS through 2011 Sess.); NEV.
REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 613.330-.390 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2011 Sess.); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
354-A:1 to :7 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2012 Sess. Ch. 290); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-4, -12 (LEXIS
through 2012 Ch. 44); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-1-7, 28-1-9 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2012 Sess.)
(including prohibited traits within one statute, but referencing ADEA provisions for age discrimination);
N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 291, 296 (Consol., LEXIS through 2012 Ch. 1-447); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-422.1
to .3 (LEXIS through 2011 Sess.); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-02.4-03 to 14-02.4-09 (LEXIS through 2011
Legis. Sess.); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2012 Legislation); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 25, §§ 1302-1308 (LEXIS through 2012 Sess.); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 659A.006, .009, .030
(LEXIS through 2011 Legis. Sess.); 43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 955 (LEXIS through 2012 Sess., Act 143);
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 28-5-1 to -7 (LEXIS through 2011 Sess.); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-13-10 to -80
(LEXIS through 2011 Sess.); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-13-10 (LEXIS through 2012 Sess.); TEX. LAB.
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of federal employment discrimination law into state regimes even more
problematic is that many state statutes prohibit not only employment dis-
crimination, but discrimination in other areas, such as public accommoda-
tions, voting, and making contracts."'
Finally, there is not a single state statute that contains the same statuto-
ry language as the federal statutes, even when confining such consideration
to substantive, rather than procedural or administrative, provisions." 6 There
are key textual features to federal discrimination law that have contributed
to its fracturing, which are simply not shared by most state laws." 7
CODE ANN. §§ 21.051-.055 (LEXIS through 2011 1st Called Sess.); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 34A-5-101 to
-106 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2012 4th Spec. Sess.); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495 (LEXIS through
2011 Sess.); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 49.60.040, 49.60.180 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2012
Sess.); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 5-11-3, -9 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2012 Sess.); Wis. STAT. §§
111.321-322 (LEXIS through 2011 Act 113); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-9-101 to -105 (LEXIS through
2012 Budget Sess.). While Louisiana's discrimination prohibitions are contained within one statutory
regime, separate provisions govern age and disability discrimination. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23:312,
:323, :332, :342, :352, :368 (LEXIS through 2012 Sess.). Alabama law prohibits discrimination solely
based on age. ALA. CODE §§ 25-1-21 to -29 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2012 Sess.). A handful of the
state statutes do not include all of the traits protected under the federal statutes or separate the regimes
differently than federal law. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-107(a)(1) (LEXIS through 2012 Fiscal Sess. &
updates) (prohibiting race, religion, national origin, gender, and disability discrimination, but not includ-
ing age); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 711 (LEXIS through 2012 Ch. 404) (prohibiting discrimination on
the basis of race, marital status, genetic information, color, age, religion, sex, or national origin, includ-
ing disability under §§ 723-24); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 22-9-1-3, 22-9-2-2, 22-9-5-19 (LexisNexis, LEXIS
through 2012 Sess., P.L. 161) (prohibiting discrimination based on race, religion, color, sex, disability,
national origin or ancestry; § 22-9-2-2 addresses age discrimination as against public policy); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 44-1009 (LEXIS through 2011 Supp.) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race,
religion, color, sex, disability, national origin or ancestry, but addressing age in § 44-1113); MICH.
COMP. LAWS SERV. §§ 37.2102, .2202-.2206 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2012 P.A. 86, 88-177, 179-
200, 202-236, 240, 249) (including age, sex, race, and other traits, but addressing disability in §§
37.1101 to 37.1214); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 48-1101 to -1115 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2012
Sess.) (separately addressing age in §§ 48-1001 to 1010); TENN. CODE. ANN. §§ 4-21-401 to -408
(LEXIS through 2011 Sess.) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, creed, color, religion, sex,
age or national origin, addressing disability through §§ 8-50-103 to 8-50-118); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-
3903 (LEXIS through 2012 Sess.) (addressing disability in § 51.5-41).
115 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §16-123-107 (LEXIS through 2012 Fiscal Sess. & updates); CAL.
GOV'T CODE §§ 12920-12926 (Deering, LEXIS through 2012 Sets. Ch. 288); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 67-
5909 to 67-5910 (LEXIS through 2012 Sess.); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 22-9-1-3, 22-9-2-2, 22-9-5-19 (Lex-
isNexis, LEXIS through 2012 Sess., P.L. 161); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4 (LexisNexis, LEXIS
through 2012 Legis. Sess. Act 239); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 354-A:l to :7 (LexisNexis, LEXIS
through 2012 Sess. Ch. 290); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-4, -12 (LEXIS through 2012 Ch. 44); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 28-1-7, 28-1-9 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2012 Sess.); N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 291, 296 (Con-
sol., LEXIS through 2012 Ch. 1-447); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through
2012 legislation).
116 See infra notes 118-128 and accompanying text.
117 See infra notes 118-128 and accompanying text.
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One key aspect of both the ADEA and Title VII is that their primary
substantive language is contained within a two-part provision. For example,
Title VII provides as follows:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or oth-
erwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin."11
The ADEA has similar original language." 9 The courts have often viewed
the first of these provisions as relating to disparate treatment claims, while
interpreting the second provision as originally governing disparate impact
claims. 2 '
However, many state statutes do not mimic the two-part structure of
the federal statutes. 2 ' Some states have defined discrimination through
118 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006).
119 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2006).
120 See EEOC v. J.C. Penney Co., 843 F.2d 249, 251-52 (6th Cir. 1988) (noting that this distinction
has been generally applied, but not definitely decided).
121 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220 (LEXIS through 2011 Sess.); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-
107(a)(l) (LEXIS through 2012 Fiscal Sess. & updates); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12920-12926 (Deering,
LEXIS through 2012 Sess. Ch. 288); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402 (LEXIS through 2012 Sess.);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-60 (LEXIS through 2011 legislation); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 378-2 to -3
(LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2012 Sess., Acts 1-200); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 67-5909 to 67-5910
(LEXIS through 2012 Sess.); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-102 to -105 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through
2012 Legis. Sess., Pub. Acts 97-848); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 22-9-1-3 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2012
Sess., P.L. 161); IOWA CODE § 216.6 (LEXIS through 2011 legislation); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1009
(LEXIS through 2011 Supp.); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 4572-4573 (LEXIS through 2011 Sess.
Ch. 702); MINN. STAT. § 363A.08 (LEXIS through 2012 Sess. Ch. 299); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 49-2-
101, 49-2-303 (LEXIS through 2011 Sess.); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 354-A:1 to :7 (LexisNexis,
LEXIS through 2012 Sess. Ch. 290); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-4, -12 (LEXIS through 2012 Ch. 44);
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-1-7, 28-1-9 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2012 Sess.); N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 291,
296 (Consol., LEXIS through 2012 Ch. 1-447); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-422.1 to .3 (LEXIS through
2011 Sess.); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-02.4-03 to 14-02.4-09 (LEXIS through 2011 Legis. Sess.); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2012 legislation); 43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 955
(LEXIS through 2012 Sess., Act 143); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 28-5-1 to -7 (LEXIS through 2011 Sess.);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-13-10 (LEXIS through 2012 Sess.); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 34A-5-101 to -106
(LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2012 4th Spec. Sess.); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495 (LEXIS through 2011
Sess.); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 49.60.040, 49.60.180 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2012 Sess.); W.
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 5-11-3, -9 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2012 Sess.); WIS. STAT. §§ 111.321-322
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words that differ significantly from those used in federal statutes. 122 Also,
many states have defined the type of harm that a plaintiff must suffer in
words that are different than the federal standard.'
23
As discussed earlier, in 1991 Congress amended Title VII to clarify
that a plaintiff could prevail if her protected trait played a motivating factor
in a decision. 24 It also added a separate disparate impact provision. 25 As
discussed throughout this Article, these amendments have played key roles
in fracturing federal employment discrimination law. 26 While a few states
define unlawful employment practices to include practices made unlawful
(LEXIS through 2011 Act 113); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-9-101 to -105 (LEXIS through 2012 Budget
Sess.).
122 E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220 (LEXIS through 2011 Sess.) (providing that discrimination
against a person is prohibited "when the reasonable demands of the position do not require distinction
on the basis of" a protected trait); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-107(a)(1) (LEXIS through 2012 Fiscal
Sess. & updates) (indicating that a person has a right to be free from discrimination, including "[t]he
right to obtain and hold employment without discrimination"); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12920 (Deering,
LEXIS through 2012 Sess. Ch. 288) (indicating that the statute is designed to provide the "opportunity
of all persons to seek, obtain, and hold employment without discrimination"); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-
60 (LEXIS through 2011 legislation) (containing numerous operative provisions with more detailed
explanations regarding what is prohibited); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 22-9-1-3, 22-9-2-2, 22-9-5-19 (Lex-
isNexis, LEXIS through 2012 Sess., P.L. 161); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1009 (LEXIS through 2011
Supp.) (prohibiting employers from "follow[ing] any employment procedure or practice which, in fact,
results in discrimination, segregation or separation without a valid business necessity"); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 20-13-10 (LEXIS through 2012 Sess.) (making it illegal "to accord adverse or unequal treat-
ment").
123 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-107(a)(1) (LEXIS through 2012 Fiscal Sess. & updates)
(indicating that a person has a right to be free from discrimination, including "[tihe right to obtain and
hold employment without discrimination"); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12920 (Deering, LEXIS through 2012
Sess. Ch. 288) (indicating that the statute is designed to provide the "opportunity of all persons to seek,
obtain, and hold employment without discrimination"); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402 (LEXIS through
2012 Sess.) (defining the prohibited actions as refusal to hire, discharge, promotion or demotion, har-
assment, or discriminating in matters of compensation because of a protected trait); CONN. GEN. STAT. §
46a-60(a)(7) (LEXIS through 2011 Legislation) (including refusal to grant a reasonable leave of absence
for pregnancy in protections and including detailed provision for pregnancy discrimination); IND. CODE
ANN. § 22-9-1-3(l)(2) (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2012 Sess., P.L. 161) (defining prohibited discrimi-
nation as the "exclu[sion] [of a] person[] from equal opportunities"); IOWA CODE ANN. § 216.6 (LEXIS
through 2011 legislation) (defining prohibited conduct to include "otherwise discriminat[ing] in em-
ployment"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4572 (LEXIS through 2011 Sess. Ch. 702) (indicating that
discrimination is prohibited in "any other matter directly or indirectly related to employment"); MINN.
STAT. § 363A.08 (LEXIS through 2012 Sess. Ch. 299) (providing that it is unlawful to discriminate
"with respect to hiring, apprenticeship, tenure, compensation, terms, upgrading, conditions, facilities, or
privileges of employment"); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 28-5-1 to -7 (LEXIS through 2011 Sess.) (prohibiting
discrimination regarding "any other matter directly or indirectly related to employment); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 20-13-10 (LEXIS through 2012 Sess.) (making it illegal "to accord adverse or unequal treat-
ment").
124 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006).
125 See id. § 2000e-2(k).
126 See supra text accompanying notes 36-42, 105-108.
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by Title VII (as amended), 27 none of the other statutes fully incorporate the
1991 amendments.
28
To the extent that the development of the federal frameworks depends
on references to statutory language and its historical development over
time, reading the state statutes in accordance with these federal frameworks
is highly suspect. Nonetheless, the next Part describes how courts have
done so.
127 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:2(XV) (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2012 Sess. Ch. 290) (indi-
cating that an "[u]nlawful discriminatory practice' includes ... [p]ractices prohibited by the federal
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-101 (LEXIS through 2011 Sess.)
(indicating that its purpose is to effectuate Title VII within the state of Tennessee).
128 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220 (LEXIS through 2011 Sess.); ARIz. REV. STAT. § 41-1463
(LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2012 legislation); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-107(a)(1) (LEXIS through
2012 Fiscal Sess. & updates); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12920-12926 (Deering, LEXIS through 2012 Sess.
Ch. 288); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402 (LEXIS through 2012 Sess.); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-60
(LEXIS through 2011 legislation); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 711 (LEXIS through 2012 Ch. 404); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 760.10 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2012 Sess.); GA. CODE ANN. § 45-19-29 (LEXIS
through 2012 Sess.); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378-2 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2012 Sess., Acts 1-
200); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-5909 (LEXIS through 2012 Sess.); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-102
(LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2012 Legis. Sess., Pub. Acts 97-848); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 22-9-1-3, 22-9-
2-2, 22-9-5-19 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2012 Sess., P.L. 161); IOWA CODE § 216.6 (LEXIS through
2011 legislation); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1009 (LEXIS through 2011 Supp.); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
344.040-.050 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2012 Sess.); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23:312, :332, :342,
:368 (LEXIS through 2012 Sess.); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 4572-4573 (LEXIS through 2011
Sess. Ch. 702); MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T §§ 20-601,-602 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2012 Gen.
Assemb.); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2012 Legis. Sess. Act 239);
MINN. STAT. § 363A.08 (LEXIS through 2012 Sess. Ch. 299); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 213.010, .055
(LEXIS through 2012 Sess.); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 49-2-101, 49-2-303 (LEXIS through 2011 Sess.);
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 48-1101 to -1115 (LexisNexis LEXIS through 2012 Sess.); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 613.330-.390 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2011 Sess.); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-4, -12
(LEXIS through 2012 Ch. 44); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-1-7, 28-1-9 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2012
Sess.); N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 291, 296 (Consol., LEXIS through 2012 Ch. 1-447); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§
143-422.1 to .3 (LEXIS through 2011 Sess.); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-02.4-03 to 14-02.4-09 (LEXIS
through 2011 Legis. Sess.); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2012 legis-
lation); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, §§ 1302-1308 (LEXIS through 2012 Sess.); OR. REV. STAT. §§
659A.006, .009, .030 (LEXIS through 2011 Legis. Sess.); 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 955 (LEXIS
through 2012 Sess., Act 143); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 28-5-1 to -7 (LEXIS through 2011 Sess.); S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 1-13-10 to -80 (LEXIS through 2011 Sess.); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-13-10 (LEXIS through
2012 Sess.); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 21.051-.055 (LEXIS through 2011 1st Called Sess.); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 34A-5-101 to -106 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2012 4th Spec. Sess.); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§ 495 (LEXIS through 2011 Sess.); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 49.60.040, 49.60.180 (LexisNexis,
LEXIS through 2012 Sess.); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 5-11-3, -9 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2012 Sess.);
WIS. STAT. §§ 111.321-.322 (LEXIS through 2011 Act 113); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-9-101 to -105
(LEXIS through 2012 Budget Sess.).
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III. FRAMEWORKS ARE IMPORTED INTO STATE LAW
Courts have often used federal law to interpret state employment dis-
crimination statutes.' 29 Using federal law as persuasive authority is not
problematic in itself, as long as that borrowing is done with due regard to
the specific goals, history, and text of the underlying state statute. On too
many occasions, however, courts have treated interpretations of federal
discrimination law as if they should be presumptively applied to state law
claims. Courts have plunged state laws into the federal framework morass,
without adequately considering whether states have made different legisla-
tive choices.
This Part first traces how problematic deference to federal law devel-
oped over time. It then discusses how deference is especially problematic in
the context of frameworks, as the dynamics at play make the frameworks
even more complicated in the state context.
A. The History of Federal Law Predominance
The federal frameworks often are imported into state law with little
explicit consideration of the state statutory regime, as courts tend to borrow
deference language that has been developed over time in regards to other
statutory provisions. 3' In many instances, a prior court has looked to feder-
al law to decide a narrow question of state discrimination law.'3 ' When the
court looks to federal law, it uses broad language regarding the similarity
between federal and state law and the reasons why state law should follow
federal law.'32 Later courts begin relying on the earlier rationale, failing to
recognize that the rationale of the first case may not apply when the court is
129 See, e.g., Anderson v. Family Dollar Stores of Ark., Inc., 579 F.3d 858, 862 (8th Cir. 2009)
(applying federal standards to Arkansas law); Greenfield v. City of Miami Beach, 844 F. Supp. 1519,
1524 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (applying federal standards to Florida state law); Lambert v. Mazer Disc. Home
Ctrs., Inc., 33 So. 3d 18, 23 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009) (applying federal standards to age case under Ala-
bama state law); Smith v. Anchorage Sch. Dist., 240 P.3d 834, 840 (Alaska 2010) (applying federal
standards to Alaska state law); Higdon v. Evergreen Int'l Airlines, Inc., 673 P.2d 907, 909 n.3 (Ariz.
1983) (applying federal standards to Arizona law); Chavez v. City of L.A., 224 P.3d 41, 50 (Cal. 2010)
(applying federal standards to California law); St. Croix v. Univ. of Colo. Health Scis. Ctr., 166 P.3d
230, 236 (Colo. App. 2007) (applying federal standards to Colorado law); Ware v. State, 983 A.2d 853,
864 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009) (applying federal standards to Connecticut law).
130 See, e.g., Greenfield, 844 F. Supp. at 1524 & n.1; Chavez, 224 P.3d at 50; St. Croix, 166 P.3d at
236; Ware, 983 A.2d at 864.
131 See, e.g., Anderson, 579 F.3d at 862; Lambert, 33 So. 3d at 23; Smith, 240 P.3d at 840; Chavez,
224 P.3d at 50.
132 See, e.g., Anderson, 579 F.3d at 862; Lambert, 33 So. 3d at 23; Higdon, 673 P.2d at 909 n.3; St.
Croix, 166 P.3d at 236.
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considering a different statutory provision than the one considered in the
earlier case.133
Consider, as an example, the interpretation of the Pennsylvania Human
Relations Act ("PHRA").'34 The PHRA is an omnibus statute that prohibits
discrimination on the basis of a variety of protected traits, including age,
sex, and handicap or disability.3 One of the earliest cases to use federal
law to interpret the PHRA was a case involving whether the defendant
could establish the defense of a bona fide occupational qualification
("BFOQ"). 36 Both Title VII and the PHRA used this term of art within their
statutory language.'37 In construing the PHRA provision to be in line with
the federal provision, a Pennsylvania state court indicated: "This is the only
reasonable, workable method, through hand-in-hand working of the state
and federal government, that will carry us to a practical interpretation of
this important exception."' 38
Later cases deferred to federal interpretations, even when the corollar-
ies between state and federal law were not as strong. For example, a federal
district court was asked to determine whether plaintiffs proceeding on an
age discrimination case under the PHRA must prove but-for causation or
whether the plaintiff could proceed on a mixed-motive claim. 39 The district
court simply looked at the main operative provision of the PHRA, noted its
similarity to the ADEA and declared that but-for causation was required."
It cited prior case law, indicating 'that [a]s a general, though not sacro-
sanct rule ... the PHRA is interpreted in accordance with the parallel fed-
eral antidiscrimination law."""'
However, the district court ignored the complexity of the issue before
it, failing to recognize that other courts had interpreted the same language
in the PHRA to allow a mixed-motive claim based on other protected traits,
interpreting the PHRA to be in tandem with Title VI." 42 The district court
failed to recognize that the Supreme Court had created a rift between Title
133 Compare City of Phila. v. Pa. Human Relations Comm'n, 300 A.2d 97, 100-01 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1973) (carefully interpreting the relationship between state and federal statutory language), with
Malarkey v. Reading Hosp. & Med. Ctr., No. 09-3278, 2010 WL 4703537, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 19,
2010) (relying on federal interpretation as a general principle).
134 43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 955 (LEXIS through 2012 Sess., Act 143).
135 id.
136 CityofPhila.,300A.2dat 101.
137 43 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2006); 43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 955 (LEXIS through 2012 Sess., Act
143).
138 CityofPhila.,300A.2dat 101.
139 Malarkey v. Reading Hosp. & Med. Ctr., No. 09-3278, 2010 WL 4703537, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Nov.
19, 2010).
140 See id.
141 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Warshaw v. Concentra Health Servs., 719 F. Supp. 2d 484,
503 (E.D. Pa. 2010)).
142 See Young v. St. James Mgmt., LLC, 749 F. Supp. 2d 281,288 (E.D. Pa. 2010).
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VII and the ADEA that was driven, in part, by those statutes' histories and
texts, which differ from the text and history of the PHRA.
In some instances, early courts included some restrictions regarding
the circumstances where federal law should follow state law.'43 However, in
subsequent cases, courts tended to only cite broad expressions of deference,
excluding the words of limitation. For example, one court explained that
when interpreting the North Dakota Human Rights Act, courts should "look
to federal interpretations of Title VII for guidance 'when it is helpful and
sensible to do so.""" However, in a later case, the references to helpful and
sensible disappear, as the later court simply notes that "federal interpreta-
tions of Title VII [provide] guidance in interpreting the North Dakota Hu-
man Rights Act."' 45
In other cases, the deference issues become more complex. Take for
example the Tennessee Human Rights Act ("THRA"). 146 The THRA pro-
hibits discrimination based on age and based on traits such as sex, race, and
religion.'47 Thus, the THRA prohibits discrimination based on protected
traits that on the federal level are found in the ADEA and Title VII. " The
THRA was not amended to mimic the 1991 amendments to Title VII.'
49
The THRA explicitly indicates that its purpose is to "[p]rovide for ex-
ecution within Tennessee of the policies embodied in the federal Civil
Rights Acts of 1964, 1968 and 1972, the Pregnancy Amendment of 1978,
and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967." 'l When inter-
preting the THRA, Tennessee courts have looked to interpretations of fed-
eral employment discrimination statutes.' Thus, the Tennessee legislature
has created an interesting quandary. It has chosen to prohibit discrimination
through one unified statutory regime. Yet, it has indicated that the THRA
should be interpreted according to both the ADEA and Title VU, which are
increasingly being interpreted to be at odds with one another.
Another similar example can be found under an Alabama law, which
only prohibits discrimination based on age." 2 The Alabama law has a provi-
sion which reads as follows: "Any employment practice authorized by the
federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act shall also be authorized by
143 See Schweigert v. Provident Life Ins. Co., 503 N.W.2d 225, 227 (N.D. 1993).
144 Opp v. Source One Mgmt., Inc., 591 N.W.2d 101, 105 (N.D. 1999) (quoting Schweigert, 503
N.W.2d at 227).
145 Brown v. Flying J, Inc., No. 1:08-cv-059, 2009 WL 2516202, at *13 (D.N.D. Aug. 14, 2009)
(citing Opp, 591 N.W.2d at 105).
146 See generally TENN. CODE. ANN. §§ 4-21-401 to -408 (LEXIS through 2011 Sess.).
147 Id. § 4-21-401.
148 See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006).
149 Compare 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(k), with TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-21-401 to -408 (LEXIS through
2011 Sess.).
150 TENN. CODEANN. § 4-21-101 (citation omitted).
151 E.g., Bruce v. W. Auto Supply Co., 669 S.W.2d 95,97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).
152 ALA. CODE §§ 25-1-21 to -22 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2012 Sess.).
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this article and the remedies, defenses, and statutes of limitations, under this
article shall be the same as those authorized by the federal [ADEA]."'53 The
ADEA explicitly provides that it is legal to take an action based on a
RFOA, which has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to be an employer
affirmative defense in age discrimination cases."M Likewise, the ADEA
permits age discrimination when age constitutes a BFOQ 55 Alabama law
does not contain either the BFOQ or RFOA language, 56 so it is hard to un-
derstand how the state law can be read to have the same defenses as the
ADEA.
In the early years of the federal discrimination statutes, rote borrowing
from federal statutory interpretation may not have been as problematic as it
is today. Many of the provisions that drew the courts' early attention were
provisions that were the same in both federal and state law.'57 However,
even if there were reasons early in the history of employment discrimina-
tion law to read state law to be in sync with federal law, those reasons are
becoming less compelling with the passage of time.
For decades the courts largely assumed that the ADEA and Title VII
worked in tandem. If an analytical framework was used in the Title VII
context, the courts applied that same framework to the ADEA 5 As dis-
cussed earlier, beginning in 2005, the Supreme Court began to differentiate
the ADEA from Title VII, interpreting the ADEA as not providing for a
mixed-motive claim and requiring application of a different analysis for
disparate impact claims.'59 Both of these changes make it more difficult for
a plaintiff to prevail on ADEA claims than on Title VII claims.
Not only has the ADEA diverged from Title VII, but over time, the
language of the federal discrimination statutes has diverged further from the
state statutes. The 1991 amendments to Title VII, which have played a criti-
cal role in interpretation of federal statutes, were not adopted by most of the
states. 6 ' Using deference standards that were developed in relation to other
provisions of state employment discrimination law is problematic.
113 Id. § 25-1-29.
114 See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005) (discussing the RFOA provision); see
also id at 239 (plurality opinion) (noting that the RFOA provision acts as a "preclu[sion]" to liability).
155 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2006).
156 ALA. CODE §§ 25-1-21 to -22 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2012 Sess.).
157 See, e.g., City of Phila. v. Pa. Human Relations Comm'n, 300 A.2d 97, 101 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1973).
158 Eg., O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 311 (1996) (assuming without
deciding that McDonnell Douglas could be used in ADEA cases).
159 See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 174 (2009); Smith, 544 U.S. at 240.
160 See supra note 128.
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B. The Structure and Language of State Employment Discrimination
Law
Courts often ignore important differences between the state and federal
regimes, trying to shoehorn state law into the federal pattern. 6' Unfortu-
nately, interpretation of federal law is laden with analytical splits, and in-
terpreting state law in kind unnecessarily draws state law into those same
splits.
This Part describes how two fractures of federal law have been im-
ported into state law despite the structure and language of the state em-
ployment discrimination statutes suggesting another outcome. It also de-
scribes central features of state law that distinguish it from federal law in
ways that are important to the federal frameworks.
As discussed in more detail in Part I.B., the courts, over the last dec-
ade, have interpreted Title VII as requiring different proof structures and
allowing for different types of claims than the ADEA' 62 For example,
mixed-motive claims are allowed under Title VII, while the Supreme Court
has interpreted the ADEA as requiring but-for causation.'63 The courts use
one structure for analyzing Title VII disparate impact claims and a different
structure for thinking about an ADEA claim."6 The Supreme Court has
signaled that it may reconsider whether the McDonnell Douglas test, which
is overwhelmingly used in Title VII single-motive cases, should be used in
ADEA cases.'65 Thus, in the federal context, there is a growing dichotomy
between how claims are analyzed under the ADEA and under Title VII.
State law has been drawn into these rifts. Consider for example, the
federal courts' interpretation of the New York State Human Rights Law
("NYSHRL"). Like most state laws, the NYSHRL is one unified statutory
regime that prohibits discrimination based on age, as well as other protected
traits, such as race and sex."6 However, the Second Circuit has assumed,
without deciding, that the Supreme Court's interpretation of the causal
standard for ADEA claims would apply to claims brought under the
NYSHRL, thus, incorporating a but-for standard for such claims. 6 This is
161 See Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 105 n.6 (2d Cir. 2010).
162 See Gross, 557 U.S. at 174; Smith, 544 U.S. at 240.
163 Gross, 557 U.S. at 174, 176.
'64 See Smith, 544 U.S. at 240.
165 Compare Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000) (applying the
McDonnell Douglas test to a case under the ADEA), with Gross, 557 U.S. at 175 n.2 (noting that the
McDonnell Douglas test does not necessarily apply to ADEA cases).
166 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (Consol., LEXIS through 2012 Ch. 1-447) ("It shall be an unlawful
discriminatory practice ... [flor an employer or licensing agency, because of an individual's age, race,
creed, color, national origin, [or] sexual orientation.. . to discriminate against such individual in com-
pensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment." (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).
167 Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 105 n.6 (2d Cir. 2010). However, in a later
case, a district court judge in the same circuit expressed doubt about whether state law should mimic the
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strange because the federal courts have used the "motivating factor" lan-
guage to describe the causal link the plaintiff is required to establish in cas-
es involving other protected classes.'68
Similar analysis occurs in disparate impact cases. Like most states,
Tennessee has a unified discrimination statute that prohibits discrimination
on the basis of age and other traits, such as race and sex. 69 Federal courts
have applied the ADEA's disparate impact analysis to age claims brought
under the THRA 7 ° Federal courts have applied Title VII's disparate impact
analysis to race discrimination claims brought under the THRA. 7' Even
though the THRA has one set of operative provisions governing race and
age claims, the courts have applied the fractured Title VII and ADEA juris-
prudence to the state law claims.
Several features of federal employment law contribute to the rift be-
tween ADEA and Title VII claims. In creating different analytical frame-
works for Title VII and the ADEA, the courts have relied on the fact that
the ADEA and Title VII are two separate statutes and that Congress did not
include the 1991 amendments regarding mixed-motive and disparate impact
in the ADEA' 72 In separating the ADEA from Title VII, the courts have
also relied on the Wirtz Report, suggesting that the report indicates that age
discrimination is functionally different than discrimination based on other
protected traits.' The question of whether mixed-motive claims should
exist under the ADEA is a part of a discussion regarding whether age dis-
crimination is and should be fundamentally different than other discrimina-
tion based on other protected classes.
However, many state laws do not share these features with federal law.
First, most states have a combined statute that prohibits discrimination
against a variety of protected traits under one unified regime. ' This organ-
izational difference is important because it means that the theoretical and
textual differences used to fracture analysis under the ADEA and Title VII
should not automatically carry over into the state context. Importantly, the
lack of that distinction provides less reason to believe that state legislators
federal standard. Saenger v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., 706 F. Supp. 2d 494, 506 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). To avoid
the potential conflict, the district court evaluated the case under the lower motivating factor standard,
reasoning that the plaintiffs claim did not even meet this lower burden. Id.
168 See Joseph v. Marco Polo Network, Inc., No. 09 Civ. 1597(DLC), 2010 WL 4513298, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 2010).
169 TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-401 (LEXIS through 2011 Sess.).
170 Aldridge v. City of Memphis, 404 F. App'x 29, 40 n. 1 (6th Cir. 2010) (noting that court was
applying ADEA analysis to THRA claim), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2932 (2011).
171 See Isabel v. City of Memphis, No. 01-2533 ML/BRE, 2003 WL 23849732, at *1 (W.D. Tenn.
Feb. 21, 2003).
172 See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 174 (2009); Smith v. City of Jackson, 544
U.S. 228, 240 (2005).
173 SeeSmith, 544 U.S. at 240-41.
174 See supra note 114.
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viewed age discrimination as fundamentally different from the discrimina-
tion that occurs based on other protected traits. Second, state legislatures
did not amend the state statutes to include the mixed motive and disparate
impact provisions contained within Congress's 1991 amendments to Title
VI.1
75
This same problem plays itself out in other contexts. For example, in
1991, Congress amended Title VII, adding language indicating that a plain-
tiff could prevail under the statute if she is able to establish that the protect-
ed trait played a motivating factor in an employment decision. "6 Based on
this provision, some courts have characterized Title VII as being divided
into two kinds of individual disparate treatment claims, single-motive and
mixed-motive, each having a different analytical structure.'77 Most state
discrimination statutes do not contain Title VII's "motivating factor" lan-
guage. Yet, courts interpreting state law have applied separate tests for
mixed-motive and single-motive claims.'78
In doing so, many courts have failed to understand that they are duck-
ing key questions about causation and intent. For example, for state statutes
that do not contain "motivating factor" language, courts should be consider-
ing whether the operative language of the state statutes require a showing of
but-for causation, whether the language is broad enough to include "moti-
vating factor" causation, whether the words actually point to another causal
standard, or whether intent requirements serve as a proxy for causation.'79
This issue also relates to whether the state law claims should have different
analytical frameworks for considering mixed and single-motive claims.
The courts' assumptions about state law have numerous spillover ef-
fects. The Supreme Court's decision to require but-for causation in the
ADEA context creates confusion regarding whether the term "because of'
in other contexts also means but-for causation."' ° One of the areas where
this ambiguity appears is in deciding whether but-for causation is required
in retaliation cases or whether plaintiffs can prevail by establishing that the
175 See supra note 128.
176 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006).
177 See Wright v. Murray Guard, Inc., 455 F.3d 702, 716-19 (6th Cir. 2006) (Moore, J., concurring)
(discussing confusion among circuit courts on how mixed-motive claims should be treated).
178 See, e.g., id. at 706, 712-13 (majority opinion); Sheikh-Hassan v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 98-
15114, 1999 WL 137336, at *2-3 (9th Cir. Feb. 10, 1999) (applying the McDonnell Douglas test to a
single-motive claim); Tatro v. Cascades Boxboard Grp. Conn., LLC, No. CV 09 4009597, 2010 WL
2196531, at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 22, 2010) (recognizing that the McDonnell Douglas test does not
necessarily apply to mixed-motive claims).
179 Cf, e.g., West v. Bechtel Corp., 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 647, 656-57 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (holding
that motivating factor standard applies to age discrimination cases under California statute).
180 See, e.g., Saridakis v. S. Broward Hosp. Dist., 468 F. App'x 926, 931 (11th Cir. 2012) (per
curiam) (noting circuit split that has developed regarding whether but-for causation is required for Title
VII retaliation claims).
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plaintiffs participation in protected activity was a motivating factor in the
decision.'8
For example, the Pennsylvania antidiscrimination statute, the PHRA,
contains a retaliation provision, indicating that it is unlawful "to discrimi-
nate in any manner against" a person "because" he or she opposed an un-
lawful employment practice. 82 Using Gross, a federal district court has
reasoned that plaintiffs proceeding on a retaliation claim under the PHRA
must establish but-for causation.183 However, federal courts also interpret
the "because of' language in the PHRA's primary operative provisions as
allowing the plaintiff to prove her case by showing that a protected trait was
a motivating factor in the decision. 84 Thus, the same words used in the
same statutory regime are interpreted to have different meanings.
As shown throughout this Part, there are many features of the struc-
ture, text, and history of state employment discrimination law that do not
parallel federal law. Most state statutes do not share the same two-part
structure as the original operative provisions of Title VII. Additionally,
most state statutes handle all protected classes within the same statutory
regime. The state statutes do not include the 1991 amendments to Title VII
in their totality. To the extent these factors have lead to the fracturing of
federal law, it is doubtful that state law should be interpreted as containing
the same analytical rifts.
C. Reliance on Common Law Decision Making
In some instances, the courts read state law to work similarly to federal
law in instances where the federal law is not being driven by statutory in-
terpretation, but rather by common-law decision making by the courts. This
Part explores whether parallel construction in such instances is warranted.
The most prominent example of reliance on common-law decision
making is when state law is read to contain the Faragher/Ellerth defense."'
Title VII provides that employers are prohibited from taking certain acts
based on a protected trait. 86 Although the term "employer" is further de-
fined within the statutory text,'87 it was unclear what type of liability this
181 See id.
182 43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 955(d) (LEXIS through 2012 Sess., Act 143).
183 Warshaw v. Concentra Health Servs., 719 F. Supp. 2d 484, 503-04 (E.D. Pa. 2010).
184 Anthony v. Duff& Phelps Corp., No. 09-3918, 2010 WL 3222188, at *8-9 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 12,
2010) (applying a mixed-motive analysis in national origin discrimination case under PHRA), aff'd, 432
F. App'x 140 (3d Cir. 2011).
185 See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Merritt v. Albemarle Corp., 496 F.3d 880, 883 (8th Cir. 2007).
186 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006).
187 Id. § 2000e(b).
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provision placed on employers for the acts of their employees. 8' This ques-
tion became more important after the Court recognized harassment as a
cognizable violation under Title VII.
In two opinions handed down on the same day, the Supreme Court de-
veloped a complex framework for thinking about employer liability for
harassment. 89 The Supreme Court held that employers would be liable for
sexual harassment committed by supervisors if the supervisor also took a
tangible employment action against the employee.' 9 However, in cases of
supervisor harassment where no tangible action is taken, the Court provided
the defendant with a way to escape liability by establishing an affirmative
defense to liability.' 9' The affirmative defense requires the employer to es-
tablish "(a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and cor-
rect promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff
employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or cor-
rective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm other-
wise."192
The words "tangible employment action" do not appear in Title VII;
nor does the two-part affirmative defense created by the Supreme Court. 9 3
Faragher and Ellerth do not represent pure statutory interpretation of Title
VII.' 9' Rather, in these cases, the Supreme Court has created, using com-
mon law-type reasoning, a federal law of agency for Title VII that is not
dependent on the statutory language.
In cases where the federal courts are gap filling federal statutes using
common law reasoning, there is greater reason to be skeptical about import-
ing these concepts into state law. Nonetheless, courts interpreting state em-
ployment discrimination statutes have applied the agency analysis created
in Faragher and Ellerth.'95 What is especially strange about parallel con-
struction in this context is that while the Supreme Court considered using
traditional agency principles to resolve the Title VII issue, it ultimately re-
jected those principles, creating its own agency analysis that combined el-
ements of traditional reasoning with the Court's view regarding how those
188 See id.; Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986) (declining to adopt a defini-
tive rule regarding employer liability for their employees' sexual harassment).
189 See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08.
190 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762.
191 Id. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
192 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
193 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006), with Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765, and Faragher, 524 U.S. at
807.
194 See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 754-55; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 791.
195 See Merritt v. Albemarle Corp., 496 F.3d 880, 883 (8th Cir. 2007); May v. Sehering Corp-, No.
09-170-B-W, 2010 WL 377012, at *7-8 (D. Me. Jan. 26, 2010). But see Murillo v. Rite Stuff Foods,
Inc., 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 12, 17 (Ct. App. 1998) (holding that employer is strictly liable for discrimination
by supervisor in cases brought under California law).
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principles should interact with the underlying goals of Title VII. '96 In the
agency context, it is logical to think that state employment discrimination
law should work in tandem with state agency principles, rather than making
agency law radically different in the employment discrimination context.
This same problem is also present with regard to the McDonnell Doug-
las framework. The McDonnell Douglas framework was created with little
reference to the actual language of Title VII or its legislative history.'97 In-
deed, when courts have discussed what the framework is, they have de-
scribed it as a "procedural device," 9' as "merely a sensible, orderly way to
evaluate the evidence in light of common experience as it bears on the criti-
cal question of discrimination,"'9 9 and as simply a means of "arranging the
presentation of evidence."2" Despite the fact that McDonnell Douglas may
not even represent an exercise of statutory interpretation, it still is broadly
imported into state law."0' However, importing such a standard into state
law should require more explicit consideration because the federal courts
have imposed an analytical structure onto statutes that is not directly drawn
from the federal statutes.
It is important that courts considering state law claims think about
whether court-created doctrines in the federal context should transfer to the
state context, especially when the doctrines are not derived directly from
the language of the federal statutes. In Faragher/Ellerth, the Court was
deciding the circumstances under which an employer would be liable for
196 See Sandra F. Sperino, The "Disappearing" Dilemma: Why Agency Principles Should Now
Take Center Stage in Retaliation Cases, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 157, 167 n.54 (2008).
197 See Sandra F. Sperino, Flying Without a Statutory Basis: Why McDonnell Douglas Is Not
Justified by Any Statutory Construction Methodology, 43 Hous. L. REV. 743, 746 (2006).
198 St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 521 (1993) (emphasis omitted). This Article will
not address whether federal courts are properly using vertical choice of law when they apply McDonnell
Douglas to state law claims. This issue is addressed in Sandra F. Sperino, Recreating Diversity in Em-
ployment Law by Debunking the Myth of the McDonnell Douglas Monolith, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 349, 352
(2007).
199 Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
200 Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986 (1988); see also Swierkiewicz v. Sore-
ma N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002) (holding McDonnell Douglas "is an evidentiary standard, not a
pleading requirement").
201 See, e.g., Acree v. Tyson Bearing Co., 128 F. App'x 419, 429-30 (6th Cir. 2005) ("Although the
Kentucky Supreme Court has not squarely addressed whether the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
analysis applies to age discrimination eases under the [Kentucky Civil Rights Act], the parties do not
dispute the issue and we will therefore assume that it does."); Higgins v. Johnson Cnty. Med. Labs. Inc.,
No. 95-2295-JWL, 1996 WL 707102, at *3 n.5 (D. Kan. Nov. 15, 1996) (assuming that McDonnell
Douglas standard would apply to Kansas antidiscrimination statute); Bd. of Educ. v. Cady, 860 N.E.2d
526, 535 (111. App. Ct. 2006) (allowing plaintiffs to indirectly prove discrimination using the McDonnell
Douglas standard); see also Farrugia v. N. Shore Univ. Hosp., 820 N.Y.S.2d 718, 726 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2006) (requiring only a de minimis showing to establish a prima facie case and shift the burden of
proof).
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discrimination.2 °2 The McDonnell Douglas inquiry is concerned with how a
plaintiff can establish a discrimination claim. 2°3 Both of these issues go to
the heart of discrimination law, a place where state choice should be re-
spected.
D. Causation and Harm Questions Represent Choices
This Part discusses federalism concerns, examining the proper balance
between state and federal law in the discrimination context.2°4 One of this
Article's primary concerns is to ensure that state preferences regarding cau-
sation and harm, which are reflected in state statutes, are respected. To
make this argument, it is necessary to understand that recent interpretations
of federal law are largely grounded in assumptions and choices that the
federal courts have made with respect to those laws.
The Supreme Court has engaged in an analysis of federal employment
discrimination law that makes explicit choices about how those statutes
operate. Regarding the ADEA, the Supreme Court has given prominence to
certain portions of the Wirtz Report to reason that the ADEA requires a
plaintiff to establish but-for causation and that it provides the employer
with an easier way to rebut a showing of disparate impact. 25 As discussed
throughout the Article, these decisions are strongly grounded in how the
federal courts have interpreted the particular history and text of the ADEA
and its relationship to Title VlI.
2°
Underlying all of the Supreme Court's recent interpretations of the
ADEA is a concern that if age discrimination is not handled differently than
other discrimination claims, then employees will be able to establish dis-
crimination in cases where liability otherwise should not lie.207 If one be-
lieves that age discrimination is rare and that age often correlates with non-
discriminatory reasons for acting, it is reasonable to impose a but-for causa-
tion standard. It also is sensible to make it easier for defendants to rebut
disparate impact claims. Lower standards for plaintiffs might improperly
entangle employers in cases where no liability should lie.208
However, with regard to age discrimination, most states have arguably
made a different choice. Underlying race and sex discrimination claims is
202 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 754 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,
524 U.S. 775, 785-86 (1998).
203 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973).
204 Cf Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41
UCLA L. REV. 903, 914 (1994).
205 See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240-41 (2005); cf Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc.,
557 U.S. 167, 174, 176 (2009).
206 See Gross, 557 U.S. at 174; Smith, 544 U.S. at 240-41.
207 See Smith, 544 U.S. at 240-41.
208 See id.
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the idea that, in most cases, these traits will not be relevant and will not
often correlate with nondiscriminatory reasons for acting.2"9 The over-
whelming majority of states have chosen to include age protections within
the same regime as sex and race protections."' The states have not used the
"reasonable factor other than age" distinction that appears in the ADEA.21
This statutory organization explicitly rejects the dichotomy contained in
federal law between age and other claims.
The federal courts also have engaged in choices about appropriate cau-
sation, intent, and harm standards even within Title VII. The prima facie
case of McDonnell Douglas was supposed to create a fairly minimal burden
for plaintiffs, after which a rebuttable presumption of discrimination would
arise : It would be reasonable to create a framework that works this way
based on a belief that discrimination frequently occurred. Likewise, creat-
ing a mixed-motive framework is reasonable if one believes that discrimi-
nation nonetheless still happens when both legitimate and discriminatory
reasons are at play.
These choices also come into play regarding harm. In the harassment
context, the Supreme Court has indicated that the plaintiff is not harmed in
a way that is remediable, unless the harassment is severe or pervasive." 3
The words "severe or pervasive" do not appear in Title VII; rather, these
words are a choice that the Court has imposed upon the statutory lan-
guage.214 The Supreme Court has indicated its belief that the terms and con-
ditions of a plaintiff's work are not affected until harm reaches a certain
level."5 This same assumption underlies court reasoning that lateral trans-
fers or bad evaluations are not harmful enough to be cognizable under the
federal statutes.216
Importantly, the federal courts have also made choices about the frac-
tured way in which they perceive discrimination. The federal courts divide
harm explicitly into certain frameworks and require plaintiffs to meet the
structures of those frameworks when proving a discrimination case.217
Many state laws do not embody these same choices and did not adopt
the original two-part structure of Title VII's original provisions. Many
states have not included "motivating factor" language in their statutes or
209 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2006) (providing BFOQ defense that allows sex to be taken into
account only in a narrow set of circumstances).
210 See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
211 See Unlawful Discrimination, in 50 STATE STATUTORY SURVEYS: EMPLOYMENT; PRIVATE
EMPLOYMENT (2011), available at 0060 SURVEYS 25 (Westlaw).
212 Buytendorp v. Extendicare Health Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 826, 834 (8th Cir. 2007).
213 Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
214 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (Title VII's operative provisions).
215 Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 67.
216 See, e.g., Cooper v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 368 F. App'x 469, 474 (5th Cir. 2010) (per cur-
am).
217 Sperino, supra note 45, at 72, 74-81.
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separately codified a disparate impact provision and instead describe the
type of harm the plaintiff needs to suffer in different terms than those used
by the federal statute." 8
Using this approach, it is likely that some state regimes will be inter-
preted to be more pro-employee, adopting broad causal standards for all
discrimination claims and rejecting some of the limits of the federal proof
structures. Other statutes will be interpreted in a pro-defendant direction,
perhaps rejecting application of the motivating factor or disparate impact
standard to any claims. This Article proposes that state law provides a via-
ble alternative to the federal regime, one that is less entangled in the sub-
stantive and procedural mess of frameworks. Allowing the pro-employee
states to take a less framework-driven approach to discrimination law
would be a welcome development for federal discrimination law.
IV. CONSIDERING HOW TO UNTANGLE INAPPROPRIATE DEFERENCE
The prior Parts demonstrate that construing state statutes in tandem
with federal law draws them into an increasingly complicated web of
frameworks that are substantively and procedurally confusing. This Article
argues that state law should not be governed by these complex frameworks.
Answering the normative question, however, does not provide a roadmap
for how courts could diminish deference. This Part details how courts and
legislatures would do this.
A. Rejecting the Uniformity Hypothesis
Some might argue that uniformity is a value that supports interpreting
federal and state discrimination law in tandem."9 Without debating the val-
ue of uniformity, this Part demonstrates that it does not result from the cur-
rent approach to parallel construction because of two different dynamics.
First, state interpretation is often read to follow federal law, but then is left
behind after a congressional amendment to the federal statute. Second, fed-
eral law is mired in circuit splits, which then also affect state law.
In many instances, state law is interpreted to follow federal law in one
way, but a later congressional amendment changes the federal regime. The
218 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-107(a)(1) (LEXIS through 2012 Fiscal Sess. & updates)
(indicating that a person has a right to be free from discrimination, including the right to obtain and hold
employment without discrimination). Despite the difference in language between the Arkansas statute
and federal law, courts have imported the adverse employment action standard into cases brought under
Arkansas state law. Davis v. KARK-TV, Inc., 421 F.3d 699, 703-04, 706 (8th Cir. 2005) (indicating that
lateral transfer claim was not cognizable).
219 See Alex B. Long, Viva State Employment Law! State Law Retaliation Claims in a Post-
Crawford/Burlington Northern World, 77 TENN. L. REV. 253, 255-56 (2010).
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question then remains whether the state statute continues to follow the old
interpretation of the federal statute or the interpretation required under the
amended federal statute, if the state legislature fails to amend the state stat-
ute to follow the federal one.
This problem can occur in many different ways, but an example best
illustrates the problem. After Price Waterhouse, courts were uncertain
whether direct evidence was required to establish a mixed-motive claim
under Title VII. 12 ° In 1991, Congress amended Title VII to explicitly pro-
vide for claims where the plaintiff could prove a protected trait was a moti-
vating factor in the decision, and in Desert Palace, the Supreme Court in-
terpreted the 1991 amendments to Title VII as not requiring direct evidence
for mixed-motive claims.2 '
Courts interpreted state law in the interim between the Supreme Court
interpretation of the federal statutes and congressional action.22 For exam-
ple, Alaska has a statute, the language of which does not correspond to the
federal discrimination statutes.23 The operative Alaska provision provides
that an employer cannot discriminate "because of' a protected trait "when
the reasonable demands of the position do not require [the] distinction." '224
Federal law does not contain the "reasonable demands of the position" lan-
guage.2 5 Despite the differences in statutory language, Alaska courts have
often looked to Title VII for guidance.2 6 After Price Waterhouse, but prior
220 Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 95 (2003).
221 Id. at 92.
222 This happens in other contexts as well. Consider first the example regarding the definition of
disability. Prior to 2008, the ADA defined a person as actually disabled if he or she had an impairment
that significantly limited a major life activity. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2006). In Sutton v. United Air
Lines, Inc., the Supreme Court held that whether a person had a disability under the federal statute must
be determined with respect to mitigating measures. 527 U.S. 471, 475 (1999). State and federal courts
began to interpret state statutes in line with the Sutton decision. Such interpretations were accepted even
for statutory regimes where the state definition of disability differed from the federal definition. See,
e.g., Davis v. Computer Maint. Serv., Inc., No. 01A01-9809-CV0459, 1999 WL 767597, at *6, *8, *9
(Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 1999) (requiring mitigating measures to be considered under the Tennessee
Handicap Act, which does not contain a definition of "handicap"). In 2008, Congress amended the ADA
to indicate that mitigating measures should not be taken into account when considering whether an
individual has a disability. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, 3556
(to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)). Many states did not amend their state statutes, and the question
remains whether these states now are stuck with the prior, restricted definition of disability. See Sandra
F. Sperino, Diminishing Deference: Learning Lessons from Recent Congressional Rejection of the
Supreme Court's Interpretation of Discrimination Statutes, 33 RUTGERS L. REC. 40, 44-45 (2009),
available at http://lawrecord.com/files/33_RutgersL Rec-40.pdf.
223 See ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220 (LEXIS through 2011 Sess.).
224 Id. §18.80.220(a)(1).
225 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006).
226 See, e.g., Smith v. Anchorage Sch. Dist., 240 P.3d 834, 839 (Alaska 2010).
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to Desert Palace, the Alaska courts indicated that mixed-motive claims
could only proceed under Alaska law upon a showing of direct evidence.227
After the 1991 amendments to Title VII, the Supreme Court interpret-
ed Title VII as not requiring direct evidence for mixed-motive claims, rea-
soning that the amendment language did not distinguish between direct and
circumstantial evidence.22 Alaska did not amend its statute. When later
litigants argued that Desert Palace governed state law claims, the Alaska
Supreme Court refused to overrule earlier interpretations of the statute, es-
sentially reasoning that Desert Palace relied on Title VII's amended lan-
guage, which was not present in the Alaska statute.229
While this latter argument appears sound, it is grounded on an inap-
propriate assumption that the initial decision to follow federal law was cor-
rect. Alaska's statutory language does not explicitly distinguish between
direct and circumstantial evidence. Given its former reliance on federal law,
the Alaska state statutory regime is interpreted as having a strange distinc-
tion that has been rejected at the federal level. Even less helpful, the Alaska
Supreme Court left open the possibility that it might later change its inter-
pretation.23 ° Litigants are then left having to wade through numerous analyt-
ical frameworks to avoid abandoning potential claims, and courts are forced
to sort through these various conflicting positions.
Also consider a state law that was interpreted to have a disparate im-
pact analysis that was similar to the one enunciated by the Supreme Court
in Wards Cove.23t In 1991, Congress amended Title VII to codify a dispar-
ate impact analysis that was different than that articulated in Wards Cove.232
Importantly, the analytical framework to be applied in Title VII disparate
impact cases was not laid out in Title VII prior to the 1991 amendments. 233
In a state where the state law was interpreted to follow Wards Cove, but
where the legislature did not amend the underlying state statute, it would be
disingenuous to interpret the state statute in two ways: following first the
Wards Cove structure and then ipse dixit following the structure proposed
in the 1991 amendments. Yet rote deference either invites this kind of rea-
soning or an outcome that leaves state law out of sync with federal law.
Over time, the chance that state statutes will become moored to prior inter-
pretations of federal law have increased as federal law becomes more com-
227 Era Aviation, Inc. v. Lindfors, 17 P.3d 40, 44 (Alaska 2000); see also Crommie v. Pub. Utils.
Comm'n, 840 F. Supp. 719, 722 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (requiring direct evidence to proceed under motivat-
ing factor test under California state law), affd in part sub noma. Mangold v. Cal. Pub. Utils. Cornm'n,
67 F.3d 1470 (9th Cir. 1995).
228 Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101-02 (2003).
229 Smith, 240 P.3d at 840.
230 !d. at 841.
231 Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656-67 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074.
232 Compare Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 656-57, with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2006).
233 Civil Rights Act of 1991, §§ 2-3, 105 Stat. at 1071.
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plex, the Supreme Court is called upon to resolve more and more circuit
splits, and Congress responds to the Supreme Court's cases.
2
11
Federal law circuit splits also invite disarray when federal law is im-
ported into state law. This situation clearly calls for courts to independently
consider how the circuit split should apply to the particular state law re-
gime. Nonetheless, courts often simply reason that the state law follows the
federal law and that therefore the state law is read in tandem with the read-
ing of the federal statute accepted in the particular circuit.
Consider the following example. Prior to 2005, a circuit split existed
regarding whether disparate impact claims were cognizable under the
ADEA. 2" Alabama has a state statute prohibiting employment discrimina-
tion based on age. 36 The statute was enacted in 1997, and its primary opera-
tive language is very similar to the main statutory language of the ADEA.237
In determining whether disparate impact claims existed under the Alabama
state statute, a federal district court simply reasoned as follows: "Insomuch
as the Alabama Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("AADEA") tracks
the ADEA in its interpretation, this court follows the law of the Eleventh
Circuit and holds that disparate impact claims may not be brought under the
AAiDEA."23s
Given the existing circuit split, the fact that Alabama law generally
mimics the ADEA does not provide the court with any basis for deciding
whether the Alabama statute provides for disparate impact claims. Nonethe-
less, the court used this general deference to justify syncing state law with
the federal circuit's interpretation of federal law. Given the fact that circuit
splits are often later resolved, this dynamic places state law in an untenable
position, with the state law remaining tethered to the circuit's interpretation
of the law.
At times, circuit splits cause even more bizarre results as different
judges within a circuit opine that state law has two contradictory meanings.
For example, the federal courts have been unable to agree on a single stand-
ard for plaintiffs trying to establish reverse-discrimination claims. Some
courts allow plaintiffs to proceed under the traditional McDonnell Douglas
test and others require a reverse-discrimination plaintiff to prove more. 3 9
234 For example, Congress has considered enacting the Protecting Older Workers Against Discrim-
ination Act, which would incorporate the motivating factor standard into many federal employment
discrimination statutes. H.R. 3721, 11 lth Cong. § 3 (2009); S. 1756, 11 1th Cong. § 3 (2009).
235 See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 239-240 (2005) (plurality opinion) (discussing
history of ADEA disparate impact claims).
236 ALA. CODE §§ 25-1-21 to -28 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2012 Sess.).
237 Compare id. § 25-1-22, with 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2006).
238 Dooley v. AutoNation USA Corp., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1279 (N.D. Ala. 2002).
239 Brierly v. Deer Park Union Free Sch. Dist., 359 F. Supp. 2d 275, 294 n.7 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)
(citing cases applying various standards to reverse-discrimination cases and noting the absence of a
Second Circuit determination of the issue).
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In Leadbetter v. Gilley,24 the Sixth Circuit considered reverse-
discrimination claims brought under both Title VII and the Tennessee dis-
crimination statute.24' In ruling on the claims, the Sixth Circuit applied its
own reverse-discrimination test to both the federal and state claims, which
required the plaintiff to establish additional background circumstances to
demonstrate the defendant "was the unusual employer who discriminates
against men. 242 The Sixth Circuit applied this standard without any sepa-
rate discussion about whether a different standard should be applied to the
Tennessee state law claims and failed to discuss a Tennessee Court of Ap-
peals decision that reached the opposite result.
243
In another reverse-discrimination case brought under Tennessee law
and federal law, the defendant did not argue that the Sixth Circuit's higher
standard for reverse discrimination should apply.2 4 The Sixth Circuit ap-
plied the same articulation of the McDonnell Douglas test as it would apply
in a traditional discrimination case to both the federal claims and the state
claims. 245 Explaining its application of federal law to the Tennessee claims,
the court noted: "[A]s they are coextensive, the Title VII analysis subsumes
the claims under the counterpart Tennessee statute. 246 The court did not
cite any Tennessee state court reverse-discrimination case to support this
proposition.247 The underlying Tennessee law on reverse-discrimination
claims does not change depending on the three-judge panel that is consider-
ing the claim, but this is the result that follows from the type of analysis
often used in employment discrimination cases.
As this Part demonstrates, the current approach of reading state law in
tandem with federal law does not lead to uniformity between state and fed-
eral law, but rather only leads to more complexity and confusion.
B. Rejecting Other Rationales for Parallel Construction
In considering whether state law should be read in tandem with its
federal counterparts, it also is necessary to explore other reasons provided
for parallel construction. This Part explores each of the commonly articu-
lated reasons and describes how these rationales are either inapplicable or
less compelling than they were originally.
240 385 F.3d 683 (6th Cir. 2004).
241 Id. at 688.
242 Id. at 690, 693.
243 Id. at 690-91; Wilson v. Rubin, 104 S.W.3d 39, 52 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (not requiring addi-
tional background circumstances in a reverse discrimination case).
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Some courts have reasoned that following the federal lead is appropri-
ate because state and federal statutes have common purposes and designs.
248
While it may be true that federal and state discrimination statutes have the
same broad purposes, it is not clear that such a statement helps courts to
resolve many of the issues facing courts. For example, saying that a statute
broadly prohibits race discrimination does not reveal anything about wheth-
er it should adopt one analytical framework over another.
Further, it is debatable whether the majority of the state statutes have
the same design as the federal statutes, even confining that observation to
the statutes as originally enacted. As discussed earlier, the federal discrimi-
nation provisions are divided into numerous statutory regimes, while most
states have adopted a unified discrimination regime.249 Many of the state
statutes never used the same language as the federal statutes to define dis-
crimination.25°
However, it is correct to say that in the past many of the state statutes
were more aligned with federal law than they are now. As discussed earlier,
most states did not amend their state statutes to reflect Congress's 1991
Title VII amendments regarding mixed-motive and disparate impact
claims.251 These amendments have created internal fractures within Title
VII and have also caused the courts to distinguish the ADEA from Title
VII.252 In the first three decades after their enactment, courts interpreted the
ADEA and Title VII as largely operating under the same analytical frame-
works.253 The 1991 amendments are central to many of the arguments that
the ADEA and Title VII should be interpreted differently.254 To the extent
that this same history is not repeated in state law, it is inappropriate to draw
state law into the chaos the courts have created in the amendments' wake.
In the early decades of the discrimination statutes, reading state and
federal law in tandem may have been more compelling. In these years, it
would be more plausible to argue that doing so created consistency for liti-
gants and made litigation more efficient. State cases appended to federal
claims would be litigated using similar analytical structures.255 However,
248 See Melchi v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., Inc., 597 F. Supp. 575, 581 (E.D. Mich. 1984); Hawkins
v. State, 900 P.2d 1236, 1240 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (indicating that state law has common intent and
purpose to Title VII).
249 See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
250 See supra notes 121-123 and accompanying text.
251 See supra note 128.
252 See discussion supra Part I.B.
253 See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
254 See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
255 Cf Deborah A. Widiss, Undermining Congressional Overrides: The Hydra Problem in Statuto-
ry Interpretation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 859, 918 (2012) (discussing how federal courts hearing both state and
federal claims may resolve both claims using similar analysis).
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the persuasiveness of these arguments has diminished over the last two dec-
ades.
256
Another rationale used to justify deference is that the federal courts
have more opportunity to consider employment discrimination issues than
the state courts. 7 While this statement may be correct, it does not then fol-
low that importing principles and adopting frameworks from federal law is
preferable. As discussed throughout this Article, the federal courts have
repeatedly interpreted federal law narrowly in ways that drew a response
from Congress. 28 In many of these instances, it appears that Congress was
not necessarily changing the meaning of words contained within the federal
statutes, but rather clarifying or reiterating their original meaning.259 Addi-
tionally, the federal courts have created chaos in employment discrimina-
tion's analytical frameworks, creating numerous, sometimes contradictory,
tests."6
A third rationale is that reading the state and federal regimes together
is the only practical method for interpreting state law. 261 Tied to this con-
cern is the idea that it is efficient for both litigants and courts for the stat-
utes to be similar.
262
However, this argument is not true in its broad form. Although the cur-
rent deference may appear more efficient in individual cases, deference to
state law has unnecessarily entangled state law in the framework chaos that
plagues federal law. As discussed in more detail in Part V, in the long run
such deference prevents state law from being a much-needed counterweight
to federal statutory interpretation.263
C. Courts Must Reconsider the Language Used to Describe Parallel
Interpretation.
Not only should courts reconsider their prior rationales for reading
state and federal law in tandem, they must also consider the language they
have used to describe the relationship between the state and federal re-
gimes.
A court considering whether deference is warranted cannot simply rely
on broad, generic statements in prior cases that the state law generally fol-
lows the federal law. As shown in Parts II.A. and IV.A., these types of
256 Alex B. Long, "If the Train Should Jump the Track... ": Divergent Interpretations of State and
Federal Employment Discrimination Statutes, 40 GA. L. REv. 469, 473-74 (2006).
257 Melchi v. Bums int'l Sec. Servs., Inc., 597 F. Supp. 575, 581 (E.D. Mich. 1984).
258 See supra notes 36 and 60.
259 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006).
260 See discussion supra Part I.B.
261 City of Phila, v. Pa. Human Relations Comm'n, 300 A.2d 97, 101 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973).
262 Long, supra note 256, at 476.
263 See discussion infra Part V.
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statements are highly suspect.2 4 Often, the quotations and citations used by
courts are short-hand versions of more nuanced discussions about appropri-
ate deference.265 And, many times, the court is interpreting a provision that
is different in substance, organization, or history than the provision consid-
ered by earlier courts.266
D. Courts Must Reconsider Prior Cases
Not only may a court be required to reconsider the language it uses, it
also may be required to disentangle prior case law that relied on such erro-
neous language. Consider cases like those in which the courts have adopted
different frameworks for considering age cases and other cases under uni-
fied state statutes.267 It is unlikely that the same words in the same statutory
provision were meant to have different meanings and implications for proof
structures. At times, courts may simply have to overrule earlier cases that
were not carefully reasoned.
Courts will then need to independently consider whether the state stat-
ute should mimic federal law, not in some general sense, but rather in re-
gard to the particular statutory provision at issue in the case. In doing this,
courts must consider whether the state provision differs from the federal
provision in a substantive way, whether the state provision derives from the
federal provision, and whether the organizational structure of the state stat-
ute differs in important ways. It also must consider whether the federal law
is being driven by its particular history, keeping in mind that this history
often is not shared by the state regime.
Consider the differentiation between the ADEA and Title VII. Most of
the state statutes prohibit age discrimination and discrimination based on
other protected traits in the same statutory regime.268 Most of these statutory
regimes do not use the terms "reasonable factor other than age," which is
the statutory language used to differentiate disparate impact claims based
on age from disparate impact claims under Title VII.269 Thus, the growing
proof structure dichotomy between the ADEA and Title VII should not be
carried over into most state statutory regimes. Refusing to import the di-
chotomy not only simplifies state law, it prevents it from being drawn into
future conflicts differentiating the ADEA and Title VII.
Further, the distinctions made between the ADEA and Title VII in part
reflect the Supreme Court's understanding that age discrimination is differ-
264 See discussion supra Parts 1I.A, IV.A.
265 See discussion supra Parts 1LA, IW.A.
266 See discussion supra Parts II.A, IV.A.
267 See supra notes 134-142 and accompanying text.
268 See supra note 114.
269 See supra notes 19, 211, and accompanying text.
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ent than discrimination based on other protected classes. On several occa-
sions, the Court has indicated that taking certain nondiscriminatory factors
into account should be expected to correlate with age and that this recogni-
tion was factored into the ADEA.27° However, it is difficult to claim that
this same argument applies to all state age claims. Some of those statutes
were enacted prior to the Wirtz Report and so cannot claim to be swayed by
its reasoning.27" ' Some states adopted age protections at the same time they
adopted other protections and used the same words to describe both sets of
protections,272 thus making it unlikely that the state intended to treat the two
protected classes differently. Given the fact that an overwhelming majority
of states have unified employment discrimination regimes, it is difficult to
argue that the legislatures intended the words of the statutes to convey that
age discrimination is somehow different. 3
Also consider the federal fracturing regarding causation. Many of the
state statutes use the same language to describe the required causation for
all discrimination inquiries.274 Additionally, many state legislatures have not
amended the statutory language in response to the 1991 Title VII amend-
ments.275 Thus, the disarray that exists regarding the McDonnell Douglas
test and its interaction with the Title VII amendments may not exist in state
regimes. Likewise, for most state statutes, there should be no dichotomy
between single-motive and mixed-motive cases.
This is not to say that resolving framework questions under state law
will be easy, either substantively or practically. For example, there are at
least two ways to interpret the 1991 amendments to Title VII. By inserting
the "motivating factor" language into Title VII, Congress could have been
simply affirming the fact that Title VII's original "because of' language
meant motivating factor causation.276 In Gross, the Supreme Court inter-
preted "because of' as only meaning but-for causation. 77 When interpreting
state law, courts will need to consider the underlying meaning of the state
270 See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240-41 (2005).
271 Eric Ledell Smith & Kenneth C. Wolensky, A Novel Public Policy: Pennsylvania's Fair Em-
ployment Practices Act of 1955, 69 PA. HIST. 489, 517 (2002), available at http://dpubs.libraries.
psu.edu/DPubS?service=Repository&version= 1.0&verb=Disseminate&view-body&content-
type=pdf l&handle=psu.ph/I 141330712# (discussing that 1955's Pennsylvania Fair Employment
Practices Act included age provisions).
272 See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
273 See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
274 See supra notes 114, 166-168, and accompanying text.
275 See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
276 Nicholas J. Thielen, Note, The New Definition of "Because of': The Supreme Court Distin-
guishes Identical Causation Language in Title VII and the ADEA in Gross v. FBL Financial Services,
Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009), 90 NEB. L. REV. 1017, 1025-26 (2012) (discussing that even before the
1991 amendments, the "motivating factor" language was already the supreme law of the land).
277 Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009) (holding that the ADEA requires
showing of but-for causation).
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statute; however, there is no need for the state courts to become entangled
in the varying proof structures that plague federal law.
On a practical level, it may be difficult for courts to untangle varying
guidance about the appropriateness of relying on federal law. For example,
a few states seem to be retreating from parallel constructions with federal
law, but in a way that makes it difficult to determine when parallel con-
struction is appropriate. In 2010, the Alaska Supreme Court held that
"while we look to federal discrimination law jurisprudence generally,"
Alaska's employment discrimination law "'is intended to be more broadly
interpreted than federal law to further the goal of eradication of discrimina-
tion.' 278 Using this statement of deference, the Alaska Supreme Court re-
jected application of the Gross case to state age discrimination claims, hold-
ing that mixed-motive claims could be pursued.279
However, in the same case the Alaska Supreme Court also reiterated
its prior holding that plaintiffs proceeding on mixed-motive claims could
only proceed under Alaska law upon a showing of direct evidence, even
though the Alaska statute does not explicitly draw a distinction between
direct and circumstantial evidence.2" The prior precedent had been based on
earlier deference to the Supreme Court's interpretation of Title VII.281 In the
part of its 2010 opinion related to mixed motive, the Supreme Court indi-
cated: "'We look to decisions under Title VII in interpreting Alaska's anti-
discrimination laws, and have.., endorsed the federal approach to analyz-
ing claims of disparate treatment.' 282 Thus, even within the same case, the
state Supreme Court is sending mixed signals about parallel construction.
Advocating that greater care be taken before construing state discrimi-
nation law is not the same as abandoning deference to federal reasoning. In
many instances, there are strong textual and historical ties regarding provi-
sions of state and federal law where similar treatment would be appropriate.
Unfortunately, in a growing number of areas, this general argument does
not hold true, necessitating more careful analysis of when to differ to feder-
al principles.
E. Answering the "When" Question
It might be argued that having courts separately construe state law will
make it much harder for courts to deal with a large employment discrimina-
tion caseload. Further, judges may lack the motivation to engage in a
278 Smith v. Anchorage Sch. Dist., 240 P.3d 834, 842 (Alaska 2010) (quoting VECO, Inc. v. Rose-
brock, 970 P.2d 906, 912-13 (Alaska 1999)).
279 Id. at 842.
280 Id. at 840 (citing Era Aviation, Inc. v. Lindfors, 17 P.3d 40, 44 (Alaska 2000)).
281 Era Aviation, 17 P.3d at 44.
282 Smith, 240 P.3d at 839 n.6 (alteration in original) (quoting Era Aviation, 17 P.3d at 43).
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searching analysis of state law, when doing so increases the work required
to decide a case. However, there are many instances when courts can retain
the efficiency existing under the current system and avoid the motivational
issues simply by being mindful of when they need to construe state law.283
It is often the federal courts that are interpreting state law.284 In many
cases, a plaintiff brings federal and state discrimination claims in the same
case that is being heard in federal court.285 In some of these cases, the feder-
al court has subject matter jurisdiction over the state law claim under sup-
plemental jurisdiction. 86 In these instances, courts may decline supple-
mental jurisdiction over the state law claims at several procedural junctures.
The federal statute regarding supplemental jurisdiction allows federal courts
to decline jurisdiction when the state claims involve complicated questions
of state law.2"7 If the federal court retains jurisdiction, it could later decline
supplemental jurisdiction if it dismisses all of the federal claims.288 In some
states, the federal courts also have the option of referring questions of state
law to the state supreme court for determination.289
Both state and federal courts should consider whether it is actually
necessary to determine an issue of state employment discrimination law to
adjudicate the case before them. In many instances, a court may be able to
resolve the case in one party's favor using any applicable standard.2 9 In
some cases the court may refuse to decide an issue of state law because one
or more of the parties has failed to properly plead or raise the particular
issue. 29'
In many instances where federal law is especially fractured, avoiding
state law issues may provide time for federal law to reach consensus on a
particular issue or for Congress to act.2 92 This is not to argue that state law
283 For example, many courts have strict procedural rules that limit their consideration of substan-
tive issues. See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Deciding When to Decide: How Appellate Procedure Distrib-
utes the Costs of Legal Change, 96 CORNELL L. REv. 203, 213-14 (2011).
284 See, e.g., Leadbetter v. Gilley, 385 F.3d 683, 688 (6th Cir. 2004).
285 Id.
286 See, e.g., Issac v. N.C. Dep't of Transp., 192 F. App'x 197, 199 (4th Cir. 2006).
287 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1) (2006).
288 Id. § 1367(c)(3).
289 For a general discussion of certification and referral of state law questions, see Jonathan Remy
Nash, Examining the Power of Federal Courts to Certify Questions of State Law, 88 CORNELL L. REV.
1672, 1733-38 (2003).
290 Hannah Arterian Furnish, A Path Through the Maze: Disparate Impact and Disparate Treat-
ment Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 After Beazer and Burdine, 23 B.C. L. REv. 419, 442
(1982).
291 See Arviso v. L.J. Leasing, Inc., No. CV-09-01102-PHX-FJM, 2010 WL 4922708, at *6 (D.
Ariz. Nov. 29, 2010) (using ADEA to evaluate Arizona state law claims because plaintiff did not contest
defendant's argument that ADEA interpretation applies).
292 It is important to note that congressional action without subsequent state legislative action does
not necessarily mean that the state and federal statutes should be read differently. In many instances
when Congress has amended the federal employment discrimination statutes, it is at least arguable that
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should then be read in tandem with federal law, but rather that more consid-
ered decision making can be used when interpreting the state statute be-
comes necessary.
F. State Legislative Fixes
Of course, it also is possible that legislatures could make a variety of
choices regarding whether to align with federal law. For example, a state
could explicitly resolve many of the concerns raised in this Article, by ex-
plicitly defining its statute's causal language and harm standard.
Another legislative fix would be for the state legislative body to enact
legislation reiterating that the state law is to be construed separately from
federal law or that the state law is to be construed liberally to effectuate its
original purposes. This is the course that Congress chose when amending
the ADA's definitional section.293 Likewise, language was added to the New
York City Human Rights Law to clarify that it is to be construed broadly,
regardless of the interpretations of corresponding state or federal laws.294
States could also go in the opposite direction. Despite the substantive
and procedural concerns raised in this Article, a state might want to align its
statute with federal law. To do so, many of the states would need to amend
their statutory language to more closely align it with federal law, including
adding the 1991 Title VII amendments and creating different provisions for
age claims and claims based on other protected traits. The state laws might
still be subject to circuit splits that occur relating to the frameworks, but the
uncertainty would be far less than the uncertainty that currently exists.
V. USING STATE LAW TO TRANSFORM FEDERAL LAW
It is important that state law develop independence from federal law to
avoid federal law's increasing disarray. However, the separation may pro-
vide substantive benefits for federal law, as well.
In many ways, separate state law interpretation could demonstrate that
the disarray in federal law is unnecessary and ill-considered. Consider the
current federal law regarding proof structures. There are different frame-
works for analyzing disparate impact claims under the ADEA and Title
VI. 295 Mixed-motive claims are allowed under Title VII, but the ADEA
Congress is simply returning the statutory language to its original meaning and away from an incorrect
interpretation made by the courts. See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
293 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4) (Supp. 112009).
294 N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-130 (N.Y. Legal Publ'g Corp., LEXIS through 2012).
295 See discussion supra Part I.B.
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requires the plaintiff to establish but-for causation.296 Some courts funnel
single-motive claims through the McDonnell Douglas framework, while
using a different framework for so-called mixed-motive claims or for sin-
gle-motive claims based on direct evidence. 297 The courts have been unable
to consistently define the difference between circumstantial and direct evi-
dence.298
It is not clear that any of this procedural and substantive complexity
actually helps courts better determine whether discrimination has occurred.
Indeed, in some circumstances, the complexity appears to thwart plaintiffs
from being able to litigate claims.299 State law can provide a model for
thinking about discrimination that is not entangled in these proof structures.
If state systems develop without strange burden shifts, the di-
rect/circumstantial evidence dichotomy, and without subtle shifts in sub-
stantive language, a model will exist to determine whether these changes
affect discrimination claims or whether they just unnecessarily complicate
the inquiry.
Separately construing state law can also help Congress and the courts
think about whether different protected traits require different legal treat-
ment. Since the enactment of Title VII, there has been scholarly disagree-
ment regarding whether race and sex are theoretically and practically simi-
lar enough to be treated within the same discrimination language."°° With
the separate passage of the ADEA, the Wirtz Report, and the courts' later
reliance on that report, similar questions exist regarding age.3 °1 In differen-
tiating the ADEA from Title VII, the Supreme Court seems concerned that
employers will face inappropriate liability for actions that have a disparate
impact based on age if the courts apply a Title VII disparate impact analysis
to age claims. °2 However, it is arguable that the Supreme Court is making
too much of the Wirtz Report and the textual differences between the
ADEA and Title VII. State law can provide a model for thinking about
whether it makes sense to deal with all protected traits in a unified way.
CONCLUSION
In the past two decades, federal discrimination law has become in-
creasingly fractured. These fractures raise critical questions regarding how
296 See discussion supra Part I.B.
297 See supra notes 49-67 and accompanying text.
298 See supra note 47.
299 See, e.g., Harmon v. Earthgrains Baking Cos., No. 08-5227, 2009 WL 332705, at *1 (6th Cir.
Feb. 11, 2009) (using McDonnell-Douglas test to dismiss plaintiff's claim).
300 Cf., e.g., Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728, 743 (2011).
301 See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
302 Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005).
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causation and harm should be defined. They also create procedural confu-
sion for both litigants and courts.
Given this chaos, continuing to interpret state law in tandem with fed-
eral law is not sound. Rather, state and federal courts should interpret state
laws on their own merits, recognizing that few state employment discrimi-
nation statutes mimic their federal counterparts in all important respects.
The differences in language, structure, and legislative history counsel
against blindly interpreting state discrimination statutes in tandem with
their federal counterparts. In freeing state discrimination law from the un-
necessary complications of the federal landscape, a second model can
emerge that may persuade federal decision makers to reconsider the various
proof structures and analytical frameworks they have adopted.
